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Article  
Remapping the Charitable Deduction 
DAVID E. POZEN 
If charity begins at home, scholarship on the charitable deduction has stayed 
at home.  In the vast legal literature, few authors have engaged the distinction 
between charitable contributions that are meant to be used within the United 
States and charitable contributions that are meant to be used abroad.  Yet these 
two types of contributions are treated very differently in the Code and raise very 
different policy issues.  As Americans’ giving patterns and the U.S. nonprofit 
sector grow increasingly international, the distinction will only become more 
salient.  
This Article offers the first exploration of how theories of the charitable 
deduction apply to internationally-targeted donations.  In so doing, the Article 
aims to contribute not only to a methodological shift in nonprofit tax scholarship 
(a strategic remapping), but also to a reappraisal of the deduction literature (an 
analytic remapping): just as existing theories of the deduction can inform our 
understanding of foreign charity, considerations of foreign charity can shed light 
back on the existing theories.  I argue that the standard rationales are 
underdetermined and undertheorized, and propose a new, integrated approach to 
the charitable deduction.  Internationally-targeted donations emerge from the 
analysis holding a strong claim to deductibility—often a stronger claim than 
domestically-targeted donations hold—on almost every relevant dimension, which 
calls into question current regulations that privilege domestic giving.  Oversight 
and foreign policy concerns, however, complicate the ideal of geographic 
neutrality and illuminate the charitable deduction’s role as an instrument of 
statecraft.  Admitting foreign charity into the debate over the deduction thus 
changes the debate’s terms; it gives deduction theory new urgency as well as new 
complexity. 
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=900061
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Remapping the Charitable Deduction 
DAVID E. POZEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Along with the income and property tax exemptions accorded 
nonprofit organizations, the charitable contributions deduction stands as 
the cornerstone of U.S. nonprofit tax law.1  The deduction was instituted 
shortly after the Sixteenth Amendment and, despite facing repeated attacks 
in Congress and the media, has only been strengthened over time.  Last 
year, it saved taxpayers more than $38 billion.2  No other country has a 
charitable deduction remotely as substantial; many countries have none at 
all.3  On its face, the deduction appears to violate several major tenets of 
tax policy: vertical equity, economic efficiency, and the ability-to-pay 
principle.  Yet it remains popular, and its generosity is widely seen as an 
engine of America’s nonprofit sector, the most robust such sector in the 
world.4  Given these characteristics, it is not surprising that the charitable 
                                                                                                                          
* J.D., Yale Law School, expected 2007.  For their feedback and encouragement, I extend my 
deep thanks to Ellen Aprill, Kimberly Blanchard, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, John Colombo, Michael 
Graetz, Martha Nussbaum, Jane Peebles, Allan Samansky, Daniel Shaviro, and especially Henry 
Hansmann.  I dedicate this paper to John G. Simon, who provided vital guidance on this project as on 
many others.  John’s nonprofit scholarship inspired me before we ever met; his kindness and decency 
have inspired me since.  I couldn’t ask for a better teacher, mentor, and friend. 
1 There are, in fact, eight different types of charitable deductions in the tax code: individual 
deductions under the income, gift, and estate taxes at the federal and (typically) state levels, plus 
corporate deductions under the federal and (sometimes) state income taxes.  The individual federal 
income tax deduction is by far the most significant of these, in revenue impact as well as scholarly 
interest, and so is the focus of this Article—and the referent whenever I generically invoke “the 
charitable deduction.”  I disaggregate the deduction only where legal, political, or ethical aspects of its 
variants meaningfully diverge. 
2 The $38 billion figure includes $34.4 billion in individual federal income tax savings, STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2005–2009, at 43 tbl.3 (Comm. Print 2005), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/ 
congress/joint/hjoint01cp109.html (reporting 2004 expenditures), and $3.5 billion in corporate federal 
income tax savings, id. at 36–38 tbl.1 (reporting 2005 estimates).  If savings from the other federal and 
state charitable deductions were included, this figure would surely top $40 billion.  Because most 
charities earn little in net revenues, the deduction is more important to them than the income tax 
exemption.  See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1428 (1984). 
3 See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 1, 25 (1985); 
David Roodman & Scott Standley, Tax Policies To Promote Private Charitable Giving in DAC 
Countries 15 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 82, 2006), http://www.cgdev.org/ 
files/6303_file_WP_82.pdf; John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of 
Charitable Contributions 1 (June 25, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Connecticut Law 
Review).  
4 See Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3, at 1 (describing the “extraordinary—probably 
unique—centrality of the nonprofit sector in American social and economic life”).  No country has 
more nonprofit organizations, employees, or expenditures than the United States, though in four 
countries nonprofits command a higher percentage share of total employment.  S. Wojciech 
Sokolowski & Lester M. Salamon, The United States, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: DIMENSIONS OF THE 
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deduction has spawned one of the largest, most contentious literatures in 
all of tax law. 
What is surprising is that this literature has almost completely ignored 
an increasingly salient distinction in the type of charitable contributions 
Americans make: donations that are meant to be used within the United 
States (domestically-targeted donations) versus donations that are meant to 
be used abroad (internationally-targeted donations).  Over the past several 
decades, the world has witnessed a “global associational revolution,”5 in 
which American nonprofit organizations,6 foreign nonprofit organizations,7 
and transnational nonprofit organizations8 have increased exponentially in 
number and degree of interconnectedness.9  In some regions, most notably 
the former Soviet bloc, independent nonprofit sectors are thriving for the 
first time.10  The United States has facilitated this revolution in no small 
part through private charity.  Even as U.S. government spending on foreign 
                                                                                                                          
NONPROFIT SECTOR 261, 266 fig.13.4 (Lester M. Salamon et al. eds., 1999).  Historian Peter Dobkin 
Hall has argued convincingly that Americans’ basic conception of the nonprofit sector—forged in the 
1950s-1960s debates over charities’ and foundations’ legal status—hinges on the special tax privileges 
that the sector receives, the deduction and exemptions foremost among them.  See PETER DOBKIN 
HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND OTHER ESSAYS ON PHILANTHROPY, VOLUNTARISM, 
AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 66–80 (1992). 
5 This term was coined by Professor Lester Salamon, the nonprofit scholar who has most 
assiduously documented the revolution.  See, e.g., Lester M. Salamon, The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector, 
FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 1994, at 109, 109; Lester M. Salamon et al., Civil Society in Comparative 
Perspective, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 3, 4. 
6 See DARRYLL K. JONES ET AL., THE TAX LAW OF CHARITIES AND OTHER EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, QUESTIONS AND ACTIVITIES 6–7 (2003) (indicating that U.S. 
charitable organizations experienced 300% growth in assets and revenues from 1975 to 1995, as 
compared to 74% GDP growth in the same period); Lester M. Salamon, The Resilient Sector: The State 
of Nonprofit America, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 3, 30 & tbl.1-5 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 
2002) (indicating that, after adjusting for inflation, revenue growth in the U.S. nonprofit sector 
increased 144% from 1977 to 1997, almost twice the growth rate of the national economy). 
7 See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 50, 52–54 (providing an 
overview of foreign nonprofit proliferation); Salamon, supra note 5, at 109–12 (same). 
8 See DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 54 
fig.1.1 (1999) (reporting that the number of international nongovernmental organizations increased 
from roughly 100 in 1960 to roughly 5500 in 1996). 
9 See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 10–11 (1998) (describing the growth of 
transnational advocacy networks); LESTER M. SALAMON, THE RESILIENT SECTOR: THE STATE OF 
NONPROFIT AMERICA 71–72 (2003) (same); Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and 
International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992) (describing transnational epistemic 
communities).  See generally LESTER M. SALAMON & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, THE EMERGING SECTOR: 
AN OVERVIEW (1994) (outlining postwar developments in the global role of the nonprofit sector). 
10 See GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at chs. 14–18; DANIEL SIEGEL & JENNY YANCEY, 
THE REBIRTH OF CIVIL SOCIETY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN EAST CENTRAL 
EUROPE AND THE ROLE OF WESTERN ASSISTANCE 9 (1992).  In 1989, for example, the only “charity” 
in Czechoslovakia was the Red Cross, and churches were severely restricted in dispensing alms.  James 
F. Bloom et al., Foreign Activities of Domestic Charities and Foreign Charities, in EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 220, 220 (I.R.S. ed., 1991). 
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aid has continued to plummet,11 American individuals and corporations 
have been channeling an increasing proportion of their donations to foreign 
causes.12  These developments raise—or, rather, raise more starkly—an 
intriguing policy question: should the tax system treat internationally-
targeted donations the same as or differently than domestically-targeted 
donations? 
Since the 1930s, Congress’s answer has been to do a little of both. 
Under our “water’s edge policy,”13 gifts made directly to a foreign charity 
may never be deducted, yet gifts made to a U.S.-based nonprofit may be 
deducted even if that nonprofit re-donates the entire gift to a foreign 
charity or uses the entire gift for its own foreign programs, and the donor 
intends this result.   However, the donor may not mandate this result; if the 
intermediate U.S. donee is merely a conduit for the foreign beneficiary, 
there can be no deduction.  While not precluding deductibility for 
internationally-targeted donations, the water’s edge policy makes these 
donations more complicated and more costly.   
Descriptively, then, our tax system privileges domestic altruism over 
international altruism, but incompletely.  Why this has been our policy for 
seven decades, and whether it should continue to be our policy, is tougher 
to say.  On the underlying question of how internationally-targeted 
donations ought to be compared with domestically-targeted donations for 
purposes of the deduction, there is little relevant legislative history, less 
judicial commentary, and, most striking, hardly any tax scholarship.  This 
silence is unfortunate not only because it has submerged deep ethical and 
empirical difficulties, but also because it has insulated the water’s edge 
policy—a policy affecting thousands of organizations and billions of 
dollars each year—from principled scrutiny.  In a globalized world of 
charity, deduction theory has remained oddly, even irresponsibly, 
parochial. 
This Article seeks to begin the process of redress by offering the first 
exploration of how theories of the charitable deduction apply to 
internationally-targeted donations.  In so doing, the Article aims to 
contribute not only to a methodological shift in nonprofit tax scholarship (a 
strategic remapping), but also to a reappraisal of the deduction literature 
                                                                                                                          
11 See CURT TARNOFF & LARRY NOWELS, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF U.S. 
PROGRAMS AND POLICY 15 figs.7–8 (Congressional Research Serv., 2004) (charting the post-Marshall 
Plan foreign aid decline in real dollars and as a percentage of GDP).  Among the world’s other 
wealthiest nations, foreign aid spending as a percentage of GDP has likewise declined precipitously 
since the Cold War.  See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 220 (2005); Tony German & Judith Randel, Never Richer, Never Meaner, in REALITY OF AID 
2002, at 145 (Judith Randel et al. eds., 2002). 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 169–81.   
13 See infra Part II.B. 
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(an analytic remapping): just as existing theories of the deduction can 
inform our understanding of foreign charity, considerations of foreign 
charity can shed light back on the existing theories.  The glare, it turns out, 
is harsh.  When the scope of analysis is expanded to include 
internationally-targeted donations, the descriptive and prescriptive failings 
of deduction theory emerge with new clarity.  The leading theories appear 
underdetermined, in that none of the rivals offers a demonstrably more 
compelling account, and undertheorized, in that their coiners have almost 
never articulated, much less developed, a supporting normative framework.  
No theory, moreover, has specified the relevant community to which it is 
meant to apply, which is especially ironic given that the “community 
benefit” defense of the charitable deduction has come to predominate in 
the literature.  Admitting foreign charity into the analysis both intensifies 
and recasts the problematics of deduction theories; but it suggests new 
possibilities for resolution.  It can also inform and, ideally, generate debate 
on the water’s edge policy.  That is the most practical and least revisionist 
intervention the Article seeks to make. 
The path of argument is straightforward.  Part II explains the charitable 
deduction and how it affects domestically- and internationally-targeted 
donations.  While the water’s edge policy has not attracted much critical 
attention, the deduction itself has been the subject of a voluminous 
literature.  Part III synopsizes the leading theories of the charitable 
deduction, which have never been assessed systematically, and reshuffles 
the arguments into an original—and, I argue, more productive—taxonomy.  
This critical roadmap of deduction theory may be taken as a freestanding 
contribution to the literature, apart from any geographic considerations.  
(Readers interested chiefly in the geographic considerations may therefore 
want to skip ahead.) 
After providing an overview of internationally-targeted donations, Part 
IV explores what the leading theories of the deduction reveal about these 
donations and, conversely, what the donations reveal about the theories.  
Even if one restricts the community of interest exclusively to the United 
States, I am nevertheless able to show that foreign gifts possess a strong 
claim to deductibility, and perhaps a stronger claim, under virtually all the 
theories.  Part V draws out the implications of this analysis and, turning 
from deconstruction to reconstruction, outlines a new, integrated theory of 
the charitable deduction that I hope will prove descriptively more 
satisfying and prescriptively more useful than the existing approaches.  
The water’s edge policy looks increasingly antiquated in light of the 
integrated theory.  Although complications of oversight and foreign policy 
counsel caution, reform—not just rethinking—is long overdue. 
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II.  THE MECHANICS OF THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
This Part summarizes the charitable contributions deduction and 
explains how the water’s edge policy and other rules constrain 
international altruism.  These constraints have a haphazard character to 
them.  Individual donations to foreign charities may not be deducted under 
the federal income tax, even if the donee has been granted U.S. tax-exempt 
status, yet all such donations may be deducted under the estate and gift 
taxes.  Corporate donations may not be deducted unless the donee uses the 
money for domestic purposes, except if the donee is also a corporation (as 
distinguished from a trust or unincorporated association) the domestic-use 
restriction does not apply.  
The debate over the water’s edge policy, meanwhile, has been quiet 
and unsatisfying.  Some tax scholars have criticized the policy as an 
irrational impediment to transnational charity, while others have rebutted 
that it is necessary for administrative reasons.  No non-tax scholars have 
weighed in; and no one has addressed the logically antecedent question of 
how to evaluate internationally-targeted donations’ claim to the deduction. 
A. The Deduction Generally 
Among the many legal privileges that U.S. nonprofit organizations 
receive, the charitable contributions deduction shares preeminent status 
with their tax exemptions.14  Enshrining in the tax code the Tocquevillian 
ideal of American nonprofit exceptionalism, both the deduction and the 
exemptions are unparalleled in their size and scope (and complexity) 
anywhere else in the world.15  Congress first adopted a charitable 
deduction in 1917 as part of a bill raising federal income tax rates to 
finance the costs of entering World War I.16  Concerned that these tax 
increases would suppress philanthropic giving,17 Congress allowed 
deductions for donations to public charities and private foundations 
“organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or 
educational purposes, or . . . for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
                                                                                                                          
14 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 11, 25; Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3, at 14.  The 
ability to issue tax-exempt bonds is a third major privilege, see John D. Colombo, The Marketing of 
Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and 
Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 660 (2001), and there are myriad lesser ones.  For a 
useful catalogue, see Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges and Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit 
Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85 (1993). The charitable deduction also extends to U.S. 
governmental entities, I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2000), but my focus in this Article is on the nonprofit sector. 
15 See sources cited supra note 3. 
16 War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 
170 (2000)). 
17 See 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis). 
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animals.”18  Estate tax charitable deductions were added the next year,19 
and gift tax deductions in 1924.20  The product of business and fundraiser 
lobbying rather than New Deal reformism,21 the corporate charitable 
deduction appeared three years later, in 1935.22  As with the federal income 
tax exemption, there appears to have been little legislative debate, or public 
debate generally, concerning the passage of the deductions.23  Compared 
with today, America’s nonprofit sector at that time was far smaller and 
more homogeneous—comprising mainly churches and donative charities 
that provided clear public goods or aid to the poor24—and the deductions’ 
expected fiscal impact was not great.  Since introducing the charitable 
deductions, Congress has in the intervening years strengthened all of them 
by raising the contribution limits and expanding the ranks of permissible 
donees, even as it has mired the deductions in regulation.25  
                                                                                                                          
18 War Revenue Act § 1201(2).  The label “public charities” for the non-foundations in this set of 
organizations, and “charities” for the entire set, is widely though not universally employed in the 
literature.  See John G. Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal 
and State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 67, 68–72 (Walter W. 
Powell ed., 1987) (providing a taxonomy of nonprofit tax categories). 
19 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098 (1919) (codified as amended at 
I.R.C. § 2055 (2000)). 
20 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319–24, 43 Stat. 253, 313–16 (repealed 1926).  The gift tax 
was repealed in 1926, but when reenacted in 1932 it continued the deduction for charitable gifts.  
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 501–32, 47 Stat. 169, 245–59. 
21 Ann F. Thomas, Panel Two: Exempt Organizations and the Corporate Charitable Deduction: 
Law, Policy, Theory, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 831, 832 (1997). 
22 Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102, 49 Stat. 1014, 1016 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170 
(2000)). 
23 See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 68 (2003) (“The early history of the charitable tax 
exemption in the United States is surprisingly uninformative.  Congress, preoccupied with the wisdom 
and constitutionality of an income tax, appears to have been acting based on some intuitive sense that it 
was simply not appropriate as a matter of history or tax policy to tax charitable organizations.”); id. at 
672 (“[L]egislative history [on the passage of the charitable deduction] is typically sparse, but excerpts 
from the floor debate reveal Congress’s belief that the steeper tax rates would reduce funds donated to 
needy schools, hospitals, churches, and other charitable organizations.”); Edward H. Rabin, Charitable 
Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 912, 912–34 (1966) (criticizing the dearth of 
commentary on the introduction of the charitable deduction). 
24 See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector, in THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 18, at 3, 16; Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit 
Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 18, at 27, 27–28, 40 [hereinafter Hansmann, 
Economic Theories].  Donative nonprofits, in Professor Hansmann’s famous typology, are 
“[n]onprofits that receive most or all of their income in the form of grants or donations.”  Henry B. 
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 840 (1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, 
Nonprofit Enterprise].  
25 For concise histories of the charitable deduction’s legal development, see Ellen P. Aprill, 
Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 848–56 (2001); 
Kenneth Liles & Cynthia Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Charities: A Prelude to 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1975, at 6, 24–41; Vada Waters 
Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and a Look to the Future, 81 
NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1061–71 (2003); Rabin, supra note 23, at 915–17.  Of these authors, only Liles and 
Blum mention issues concerning internationally-targeted donations.  Liles & Blum, supra, at 27–30.   
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When present-day American individuals and corporations contribute 
money or property (but not services) to a nonprofit, they may be entitled to 
a deduction under the income, gift, or estate tax at the federal and state 
levels.  Taxpayers who elect to take the standard federal income tax 
deduction, introduced in 1944 to simplify tax compliance,26 are not eligible 
to deduct their contributions.  The principal provision for deductibility is 
I.R.C. § 170, which defines the entities eligible to receive deductible 
contributions.27  By far the largest class of eligible entities remains the 
public charities, now catalogued along with charitable foundations in 
§ 170(c)(2).28  Gifts to other organizations typically are not deductible, 
except for those made to U.S. states and their political subdivisions, 
veterans organizations, fraternal organizations (if used exclusively for 
charitable purposes), or cemetery associations.29  The language of 
§ 170(c)(2) mimics that of its more famous cousin, § 501(c)(3), so that 
while many types of nonprofits—all 501(c) organizations—are tax-exempt, 
only charities and these select others can also receive deductible gifts.  
This is “the most celebrated result” of 501(c)(3) recognition;30 more so 
than any other privilege, deductibility sets charities apart as our legal 
system’s most favored breed of nonprofit organization.    
Deductibility is subject to a labyrinthine web of rules and regulations; 
for our purposes it suffices to sketch the key features.  All contributions, to 
be deductible, must pass the IRS’s quid pro quo test, which requires that 
the donor make the transfer “without adequate consideration” in 
exchange.31  For individuals and corporations, contributions to public 
charities are deductible under § 170 only to the extent that they do not 
exceed 50% or 10%, respectively, of taxable income.32  Under the gift and 
estate taxes, no such caps apply.33  Charitable gifts of property receive 
especially generous tax treatment: if a donor owns property for more than 
                                                                                                                          
26 Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, Pub. L. No. 315, § 9(a), 58 Stat. 231, 236–37. 
27 I.R.C. § 170 determines federal income tax deductibility.  I.R.C. § 170 (2000).  The gift tax 
deduction, id. § 2522(a), and the estate tax deduction, id. § 2055(a), employ similar definitions of 
eligible recipients. 
28 See supra note 18 (explaining the terms “charities” and “public charities”).  The only 
differences between the current § 170(c)(2) and the original provision are that “corporations and 
associations” has now been expanded to “corporation[s], trust[s], or community chest[s], fund[s], or 
foundation[s]” and a new category of organizations that “foster national or international amateur sports 
competition” has been added.  Compare War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917), 
with I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2000). 
29 I.R.C. § 170(c)(1), (3)–(5) (2000).   
30 Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3, at 6. 
31 See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 690–92 (1989); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 
105. 
32 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A), (b)(2) (2000).  The limit is 30% for individuals’ gifts of appreciated 
property.  Id. § 170(b)(1)(C). 
33 Id. §§ 2522, 2055. 
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twelve months prior to donating it, the amount of her deduction will equal 
the fair market value of the property, allowing her both to receive a 
deduction for the appreciation and to escape taxation on it.34  Reflecting 
private foundations’ “third-class” status in charitable tax law,35 gifts to 
them may be denied such market-value deductibility36 and are subject to 
lower percentage-of-income deductibility limits.37 
B. Deductions for Internationally-Targeted Gifts 
For an individual or corporate charitable contribution to be deductible 
under the income tax, § 170 stipulates that the donee must be “created or 
organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under the 
law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any 
possession of the United States.”38  This is our water’s edge policy:39 it 
conditions income tax deductibility on the donee’s domestic situs.  The 
only exception, created through bilateral tax treaties, is that donations to 
charities incorporated in Canada, Mexico, or Israel are deductible to the 
extent that the donor has income from sources in that country.40  The gift 
and estate tax deductions, by contrast, contain no such geographic 
limitation.41  And foreign charities have always been eligible for U.S. 
income tax exemption under § 501(c)(3).42 
                                                                                                                          
34 See id. § 170(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c) (2002); see also I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i) (2000) 
(requiring donated tangible personal property to be related to a charity’s goals for the donor to deduct 
its appreciation). 
35 Boris I. Bittker, Should Foundations Be Third-Class Charities?, in THE FUTURE OF 
FOUNDATIONS 132 (Fritz F. Heimann ed., 1973); see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 
373–74, 382–83 (outlining the ways in which the tax system disadvantages foundations relative to 
other types of nonprofits). 
36 The Code now permits fair-market-value deductibility for gifts of “qualified appreciated stock” 
to private foundations.  I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii), (e)(5) (2000). 
37 Id. § 170(b)(1)(B)–(D). 
38 Id. § 170(c)(2)(A). 
39 I take this term from Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3, at 15.  Other tax scholars have 
referred to § 170’s water’s edge policy, less colorfully, as the “geographical limitation” or 
“geographical restriction,” see, e.g., Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 TAX LAW. 655 passim 
(1995), or the “domestic organization restriction,” see, e.g., Lester M. Salamon  & Susan L.Q. Flaherty, 
Introduction to LESTER M. SALAMON, THE INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO NONPROFIT LAW 8, 28–29 
(1997), or some variation thereof. 
40 For overviews of these treaties, see Joannie Chang et al., Cross-Border Charitable Giving, 31 
U.S.F. L. REV. 563, 601–12 (1997); Dale, supra note 39, at 665–68; and Zack D. Mason, Foreign 
Charitable Contribution Deductions: A Shift in U.S. Tax Treaty Policy?, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 
624 (1993).  Standard percentage limitations apply under the Canada and Mexico treaties, but the Israel 
treaty fixes the limitation at 25%, based only on income from sources within Israel.  Chang et al., 
supra, at 607. 
41 Nonresidents, however, do face geographical restrictions under the gift and estate tax.  For their 
gifts to be deductible under the gift tax, donees must be domestic and non-corporate donees must use 
the gift exclusively within the United States.  I.R.C. § 2522(b)(2)–(3) (2000).  When nonresidents make 
charitable bequests to trustees, the estate tax deduction is limited to domestic use.  Id. 
§ 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii).  While residents’ bequests to foreign governments have generally been denied 
deductibility, see, e.g., Edwards v. Phillips, 373 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1967), some courts have held such 
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Even though the Code strictly bars income tax deductions for gifts 
made directly to foreign charities, two important qualifications to the 
water’s edge policy help temper its isolationism and facilitate the flow of 
international funds.  U.S.-based nonprofits may, first, engage in charitable 
activities abroad and, second, re-donate received funds to foreign charities 
without jeopardizing the deductions of individual donors.  For corporate 
donors, however, the deduction will be lost if the donee uses or sends the 
contribution abroad—with the emphatic, if strange, exception that this 
domestic-use requirement does not apply when the donee is also a 
corporation.43  In the case of re-donation, moreover, the IRS will deny 
individual and corporate deductions if the intermediate U.S. charity is a 
mere conduit—if “the domestic organization is only nominally the donee 
[and] the real donee is the ultimate foreign recipient.”44  The seminal 
authority for determining when a domestic organization is impermissibly 
acting as a conduit is Revenue Ruling 63-252, which distinguishes 
between, on the one hand, cases where the U.S. charity has no 
discretionary authority and must transmit certain earmarked funds to the 
foreign charity and, on the other hand, cases where the U.S. charity 
reserves the power to review and approve grants to the foreign charity or 
where the foreign organization is a controlled subsidiary.45  The former 
cases are non-deductible, the latter deductible.  Within the latter camp, 
deductions may be allowed even if the intermediate U.S. donee operates as 
a “friends of” organization and gives funds only to a particular named 
foreign entity.46  To preserve deductibility, all international gifts by a U.S. 
intermediate donee must fall within the charitable mission and purpose of 
the U.S. entity, and the U.S. entity must exercise ongoing scrutiny over its 
                                                                                                                          
bequests deductible when restricted to charitable purposes.  See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United 
States, 438 F.2d 684 (1st Cir. 1971). 
42 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 66-177, 1966-1 C.B. 132.  Few foreign charities apply for IRS recognition 
of their exempt status because legal expenses and reporting requirements make doing so potentially 
costly, few foreign charities have U.S.-source income, and recognition carries with it no right to receive 
deductible gifts.  See Jane Peebles, Cross Border Charitable Gifts 8 (1999), http://www.ffslaw.com/ 
ffs_pdfs/Crs_Brdr_Chrtbl_Gfts_Jane.pdf.  Although the Code lessens foreign charities’ filing 
obligations in various ways, the IRS has applied these provisions inconsistently.  Dale, supra note 39, 
at 688–91. 
43 See Rev. Rul. 69-80, 1969-1 C.B. 65.  Congress has never explained why the donee’s legal 
form should matter in this way.  Dale, supra note 39, at 672–73.  Many think it was a drafting error.  
See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 MO. L. REV. 85, 105 & 
n.64 (1985) (describing the “well-recognized drafting error” and failed congressional efforts to correct 
it).  
44 Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101. 
45 Id.; see also Dale, supra note 39, at 662–63 (interpreting the Ruling and highlighting its 
importance). 
46 Rev. Rul. 74-229, 1974-1 C.B. 142; Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48. 
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gift unless it can show that the foreign donee meets the terms of 
§ 501(c)(3).47 
In addition to the substance of the water’s edge policy, the complexity 
of these rules is itself a deterrent to international altruistic investment.48  So 
is the third-class status of foundations.49  Because foreign charities not 
recognized by the IRS may be classified as private foundations50 and 
because much of Americans’ foreign giving runs through foundations,51 
the disincentive effects of their inferior deductibility are magnified in the 
international context. 
C. The Undertheorized Water’s Edge Policy 
From 1917 to 1938, there was no water’s edge policy for the individual 
income tax deduction.  Then, following the Revenue Act of 1935, which in 
promulgating the corporate charitable deduction restricted it to domestic 
donees (and when the donee is not a corporate entity, to domestic use),52 
                                                                                                                          
47 This scrutiny is known as “expenditure responsibility,” and the § 501(c)(3) determination as the 
“foreign equivalency” test.  See Dale, supra note 39, at 663, 685.  For more detailed explication of U.S. 
deduction policy for international gifts, see generally Kimberly S. Blanchard, U.S. Taxation of Foreign 
Charities, 8 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 719 (1993); Chang et al., supra note 40; Nina J. Crimm, Through 
a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of Federal Tax Laws and Tax Policies 
Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private Foundations and Their Donors, 23 VA. TAX REV. 1, 47–
113 (2003); Dale, supra note 39; and Peebles, supra note 42.  Professor Crimm also provides a broad 
legislative history of the geographic restrictions on federal deductibility in Crimm, supra, at 37–47.   
48 Cf. Dale, supra note 39, at 696 (criticizing the “incredible complexity” of the rules bearing on 
foreign charities); Darryll K. Jones, The Neglected Role of International Altruistic Investment in the 
Chinese Transition Economy, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 71, 118 (2004) (same). 
49 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.  Note also that the corporate-donee exception to 
the corporate domestic-use requirement, see supra note 43 and accompanying text, does not apply to 
foundations.  Nina Crimm has documented in great detail the tax rules bearing on foundations’ 
international grantmaking activity.  Crimm, supra note 47, at 72–113.  Her interviews with 
decisionmakers at domestic private foundations found these rules to have a significant disincentive 
effect: 
Respondents uniformly indicated that in past years their foundations’ global 
philanthropy programs have been less constrained by their own finances than they 
have by administrative considerations imposed by the Code rules and Treasury 
Regulations.  . . .  Moreover, they consistently indicated that international grant-
making was significantly more time consuming and financially costly than domestic 
grant-making, with the result being that domestic philanthropy is a more attractive 
alternative for some. 
. . . . 
There appears to be a consensus [among foundation administrators] that some of 
the tax rules are unnecessarily complex and perhaps even inappropriate in the global 
philanthropy context. 
Id. at 124–25. 
50 See Dale, supra note 39, at 690 (describing the IRS’s inconsistent application of § 508(b), the 
“[p]resumption that [unregistered] organizations are private foundations,” I.R.C. § 508(b) (2000), to 
foreign organizations); Jones, supra note 48, at 119 (asserting that “a foreign recipient is more likely 
[than a comparable domestic recipient] to be classified as a private foundation”). 
51 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 696.  See generally COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, 
INTERNATIONAL GRANTMAKING (3d ed. 2004). 
52 Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170 
(2000)).  
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the Revenue Act of 1938 introduced the water’s edge policy for 
individuals.53  A famous passage of the House Report addressed this 
change explicitly: 
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted 
to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that 
the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its 
relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to 
be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the 
benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.  
The United States derives no such benefit from gifts to 
foreign institutions, and the proposed limitation is consistent 
with the above theory.  If the recipient, however, is a 
domestic organization the fact that some portion of its funds 
is used in other countries for charitable and other purposes 
(such as missionary and educational purposes) will not affect 
the deductibility of the gift.54 
Professor Harvey Dale, in the best-known article to discuss 
international deductions, has criticized this passage as both bad history, 
because charities’ tax privileges were never in fact predicated on their 
relieving government burdens, and bad logic, because “it makes no sense 
to deny the deduction on the basis of where the donee is organized but to 
permit it even if the funds are expended abroad.”55  Even though, as Dale 
acknowledges, requiring a U.S. intermediate donee may simplify IRS 
oversight, he argues that any number of reporting systems—such as one 
requiring more detailed substantiation of foreign gifts under existing Code 
provisions—could achieve the same end more directly, and in any event 
the legislative history offers no indication that Congress had in mind such 
oversight concerns.56  The fact that the income tax exemption and the gift 
and estate tax charitable deductions contain no geographical restrictions, 
moreover, belies the water’s edge policy’s claim to administrative 
necessity or indeed to any principled basis.57  Dale concludes that “[i]n a 
world in which charity increasingly crosses—and ought to cross—national 
borders, U.S. donors should not be forced to resort to formalisms, such as 
                                                                                                                          
53 Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 23(o), 52 Stat. 447, 463 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170 
(2000)). 
54 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19–20 (1938). 
55 Dale, supra note 39, at 660–61. 
56 Id. at 663 & nn.39–40. 
57 Id. at 663.  But see Blanchard, supra note 47, at 728 (“[I]t is at least arguable that monitoring is 
less of a concern under the estate and gift tax rules simply because fewer U.S. taxpayers are subject to 
these taxes than are subject to income taxes.”). 
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‘friends of’ organizations, in order to provide needed support abroad.”58  
Writing with Professors John Simon and Laura Chisolm more recently, 
Dale further charges that “Congress has never provided a satisfactory 
explanation for a rule that, at least on gross examination, has an isolationist 
scent and that is, on the other hand, easily bypassed.”59 
Others have echoed and extended Dale’s critique of the water’s edge 
policy—though I do not want to overstate the vigor of this critical strain, 
which has been confined to a handful of articles in mostly specialized 
journals.60  Following Dale (for whose research center they were interning 
at the time), Joannie Chang and co-authors find logically unsupportable the 
Code’s disparate treatment of direct versus indirect international 
contributions, especially because all such contributions “may assist the 
United States.”61  Kimberly Blanchard decries the “complexity, ambiguity, 
and irrationality” of the water’s edge policy, and suggests, like Dale, that 
monitoring concerns could be addressed by requiring any foreign 
organization seeking tax-deductible U.S. donations to secure IRS 
recognition of its exempt status, just as foreign charities can do currently 
under § 501(c)(3).62  Professor Penina Kessler Lieber calls the water’s edge 
policy “archaic,” a “product of the Depression mentality of the mid-late 
1930’s, when America was still focused inward on national recovery [and] 
had a New Deal domestic agenda and an isolationist foreign policy.”63  
Professor Darryll Jones locates the water’s edge policy in a broader matrix 
of regulations impeding international altruistic investment, of which the 
water’s edge policy is the most direct and perhaps the most dire.  Jones 
shows how the IRS’s classification of certain unregistered charities as 
foundations, the foreign tax credit’s disqualification of international 
donations, and the penalties levied against foundations making non-U.S. 
grants—avoided only if the foundation exercises burdensome “expenditure 
responsibility”—all conspire to make international donations more costly 
than domestic donations.64  
                                                                                                                          
58 Dale, supra note 39, at 663. 
59 Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3, at 15–16 (citation omitted). 
60 A Westlaw key cite search, conducted on August 29, 2006, indicates that Dale’s article has 
been cited nine times in the decade since its publication.  No other article critiquing the water’s edge 
policy has garnered as many citations, and media coverage of the issue appears to have been negligible.  
Dale notes at the start of his article that despite the recent explosion of international charitable activity, 
“only a few articles and secondary sources address the relevant tax and other issues raised.”  Dale, 
supra note 39, at 659.  The only other issues Dale discusses are the implications of several statutes (the 
Export Administration Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the United Nations 
Participation Act) for gifts to foreign charities.  Id. at 694–96.  
61 Chang et al., supra note 40, at 569. 
62 Blanchard, supra note 47, at 728. 
63 Penina Kessler Lieber, 1601–2001: An Anniversary of Note, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 731, 741 
(2001).  
64 Jones, supra note 48, at 119–24. 
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I am sympathetic to all of these critiques, yet I believe them 
fundamentally deficient.  While the opponents of the water’s edge policy 
are in broad agreement that it makes international giving unduly difficult, 
they never explain why internationally-targeted donations deserve tax 
treatment comparable to, or different from, that offered domestically-
targeted donations.  If anything, Professors Dale, Lieber, and Jones 
intimate that international gifts may have an even stronger claim to 
deduction than domestic gifts, on account of foreign charities’ greater need 
for support.  But need for support has never driven deductibility or almost 
any other aspect of nonprofit tax policy.65  That none of the authors feels 
compelled to argue for international donations’ deduction-worthiness 
evinces how commonsensical it must appear to them.  They are not alone 
in this: even the water’s edge policy’s supporters (such as there are; the 
literature in favor of the policy is even sparser than the literature against it) 
have reduced the question to one of implementation.66  
In contrast to the scholars who would later interrogate their handiwork, 
the drafters of the water’s edge policy said nothing about implementation 
and focused instead on the prior question of deservedness.  They just did so 
ineptly.  No one today would defend the drafters’ argument that foreign 
charities should not receive deductible gifts because, unlike domestic 
charities, they do not alleviate governmental burdens.  Basing deductibility 
solely on this criterion would be both underinclusive, in that many 
nonprofits eligible to receive deductible gifts—religious organizations, for 
example—plainly do not provide governmental services, and 
overinclusive, in that many for-profit contractors plainly do provide 
governmental services.  
Still, the drafters were on to something.  However much cross-border 
giving might complicate them, oversight and administrability are 
contingent questions, questions of process; figuring out the best scheme for 
implementing an international deduction policy presupposes a normative 
view of what that policy should achieve.  Yet as the next Part will show, 
the major theorists of the charitable deduction, like the participants in the 
                                                                                                                          
65 See Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3, at 31–34. 
66 See, e.g., Crimm, supra note 47, at 139 & n.432 (defending the water’s edge policy as 
necessary for IRS enforcement of § 170); Wiedenbeck, supra note 43, at 103–06 (same); Gabriel 
Rudney, Tax Rules and Overseas Philanthropy, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Aug. 1978, at 16, 17 
(claiming that U.S. authorities have “virtually no way to make a foreign voluntary organization 
accountable and assure that money going abroad would be used for the philanthropic purpose”).  In a 
recent speech, after reminding the audience that his 1995 article had critiqued the water’s edge policy’s 
legislative record as “bad history, bad philosophy, and bad logic,” Harvey Dale exclaimed: “I actually 
don’t know anyone who disagrees!”  Harvey P. Dale, Global Giving and Governance, Address Before 
the Committee on Exempt Organizations, American Bar Association Tax Section 5 (May 9, 2003), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/tax/groups/eo/0305dale.pdf. 
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water’s edge policy debate, have similarly scanted the distinction between 
foreign and domestic charity.  The remarkable variation in how countries 
treat internationally-targeted donations’ deductibility suggests there are no 
necessary, or easy, answers here.67 
III.  THEORIES OF THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION: A CRITICAL ROADMAP 
Beginning in earnest after World War II and, like the nonprofit sector 
itself, taking off in the 1970s, controversy has long surrounded the 
charitable deduction and the nonprofit tax exemptions.68  The controversy 
remains, but supporters of the deduction (and the exemptions) have largely 
won out. Politically, this was evident last year when, in forming an 
advisory commission to pursue fundamental tax reform, President Bush 
explicitly admonished it not to undermine the deduction.69  Academically, 
although some prominent tax scholars have argued against the deduction as 
improper, inequitable, or inefficient70—and advocated alternative means of 
government support for charity such as direct provision or direct funding—
most have defended it.  Professors William Andrews and Boris Bittker, as 
Sections A and B explain, dominated the first generation of the debate with 
                                                                                                                          
67 SALAMON, supra note 39, provides a valuable resource in documenting the diversity of tax 
policy approaches to internationally-targeted charitable contributions.  On one end of the spectrum, 
Brazil, Russia, and Thailand allow no deductions unless all donated funds are used within the home 
country.  Id. at 67, 262, 309.  On the other end of the spectrum, Italy, Poland, and South Africa place no 
geographic restrictions whatsoever on the deduction.  Id. at 192, 251, 274.  In between, there is great 
variation.  Ireland, for example, allows no deductions for internationally-targeted donations, but its 
government will give matching grants for gifts to certain developing-world charities.  Id. at 159.  But cf. 
THE EUROPEAN FOUNDATION: A NEW LEGAL APPROACH 23 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 2006) (noting 
the uncertainty over whether European Union countries’ geographic restrictions on deductibility 
contravene the free movement of capital, a fundamental freedom under the European Community 
Treaty, and proposing transnational “European Foundations” as a solution).  India allows foreign 
charities to receive deductible gifts if they register with the Home Ministry and provide financial 
statements for each contribution.  SALAMON, supra note 39, at 148.  Germany has similar policies to 
ours.  Id. at 124.  When viewed in comparative context, the remarkable aspect of the United States’ 
water’s edge policy is not its descriptive content—many countries that have a charitable deduction 
privilege domestically-targeted contributions in some way.  The remarkable aspect is the near-total lack 
of normative content in the congressional and academic debates surrounding the policy. 
68 For a brief overview of the political controversies and citations to sources, see Hall, supra note 
24, at 18–21; and John K. McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy Perspective, 3 
VA. TAX REV. 229, 229–30 (1984). 
69 Most observers understood the reference to “recognizing the importance of homeownership and 
charity in American society” in the Executive Order creating the commission, Exec. Order No. 13,369, 
§ 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 155, 155 (2006), to impose a mandate on the commission to preserve the home 
mortgage and charitable deductions.  See, e.g., Fred Barnes, Back to Business, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 
2005, at A16, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (“The president has instructed the panel 
only that it must preserve the home mortgage and charitable deductions.”). 
70 See Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. 
REV. 37 (1972) (identifying these three lines of criticism and providing rebuttals).  “At first blush,” 
Bittker begins his classic article, “the question of the deduction’s ‘propriety’ . . . has been so frequently 
debated that one wonders whether anything new remains to be said.”  Id. at 37.  That was in 1972, 
before scholarship on the deduction had taken off.  A basic descriptive goal of this Article is to 
highlight just how much has been left unsaid. 
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efforts to cast the charitable deduction as a tool to ensure the proper 
treatment of donors.  A second generation of scholars has moved away 
from donor-focused theories and instead defended the deduction as a tool 
of public policy—as a government subsidy creating community benefits 
sufficient to justify its costs.  Subsidy theories come in many stripes.  
Section C outlines the four main variants.71 
As the taxonomy provided in this Part suggests, commentators have 
invoked a great range of theories in support of the charitable deduction.  
Yet as will also become clear, each of these theories would be insufficient 
on its own to account for the practice of the deduction, in part because the 
scope and variety of qualifying donees are now so vast that any unitary 
theory is bound to be descriptively unsatisfying.  Many of the theories lack 
a coherent normative basis.72  All are blind to the international/domestic 
distinction.  In consequence, even as consensus has started to solidify that 
the deduction is a subsidy best justified by reference to its community 
benefits, there has emerged a subtle but profound dissensus over what 
these benefits are and why exactly they are beneficial.  For all their 
richness, the deduction theories remain not only underdetermined, but also 
undertheorized. 
Hence, in addition to synopsizing the leading theories of the deduction, 
this Part seeks to impose some analytic structure on what has been a 
sprawling, often inconsistent, deeply disjointed literature.  When the 
normative foundations of deduction theories are exposed and their 
descriptive weaknesses interrogated, it becomes clear that not only does 
the charitable deduction (as we know it) lack a decisive, stand-alone 
justification; no such justification is possible. 
                                                                                                                          
71 My focus is thus on theories that would preserve the charitable deduction in some form. 
Although I incorporate their criticisms into the analysis, I do not directly discuss the leading proponents 
of repealing the deduction altogether.  Among the best-known works to this effect are C. HARRY 
KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1960); Mark G. Kelman, Personal 
Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a 
Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979); Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for 
Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377 (1972); and 
Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison 
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).  I also do not engage at much 
depth proposed alternatives to the deduction such as matching grant or voucher schemes, except to 
consider in Part V their implications for foreign contributions. 
72 Professor Thomas Griffith was the first—and, to my knowledge, last—commentator to point 
out that the leading theories of the deduction all “share [this] critical flaw: none is grounded on a 
coherent normative principle.”  Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income 
Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 345 (1989). 
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A. Andrews’s Base-Defining Rationale 
Although its popularity has ebbed in recent years, the most famous 
theory of the charitable deduction remains that of William Andrews, whose 
1972 article Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax sought to justify 
the charitable and medical deductions on tax-base-defining grounds.73  
Andrews begins by adopting, like many tax theorists, Henry Simons’s 
definition of income as the sum of personal consumption plus wealth 
accumulation over a given time period.74  He then reasons that charitable 
contributions should be excluded from the concept of taxable personal 
consumption because they divert resources from private, preclusive 
appropriation to “common goods”—goods and services “whose enjoyment 
is not confined to contributors nor apportioned among contributors 
according to the amounts of their contributions.”75  Whatever psychic or 
reputational benefit a taxpayer might receive from donating to charity is 
irrelevant; she does not consume anything of scarcity in transferring 
economic resources from her own household to society at large.  Nor does 
she increase her net worth.  Applying the Simons formula, therefore, the 
income she devotes to charity does not constitute taxable income: it is not 
part of the tax base.76  To bolster this formalistic conclusion, Andrews also 
appeals to economic neutrality.  If the taxpayer had forgone income in 
order to donate more time to charity, that volunteering would not have 
been taxed, so donations of income should likewise escape taxation.77  
Andrews’s argument leads him to criticize the percentage limits on the 
deduction and the ability of appreciated property gifts to be deducted for 
fair market value,78 but otherwise to find our deduction system essentially 
sound. 
More important, Andrews’s argument leads him to reject the 
conventional view of the charitable deduction as a government subsidy (or 
“tax expenditure”79) because the tax-base-defining logic implies that the 
                                                                                                                          
73 William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 
(1972). 
74 Id. at 313, 320–21. 
75 Id. at 346. 
76 Id. at 346, 375–76. 
77 Id. at 352–54. 
78 Id. at 372–74 
79 Tax expenditures are deviations from the normal tax structure that are “designed to favor a 
particular industry, activity, or class of persons” and can be seen as economically equivalent to direct 
government outlays.  STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985).  The 
canonical presentation of the tax expenditure view appears in Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax 
Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary To Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental 
Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352, 381–94 (1970) (critiquing the charitable deduction specifically); 
and Surrey, supra note 71 (critiquing tax expenditures generally).  Because Professor Surrey, a Harvard 
colleague of Andrews, was such a fierce and respected critic of indirect subsidies like the deduction, 
Andrews was working within an academic context in which the tax expenditure view must have carried 
a strong anti-deduction taint.  
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government never has a claim to donated monies.80  In this, Andrews 
echoes proponents of the original deduction in 1917 who saw private 
donations as coming from the “surplus” of individual income.81  Whereas 
subsidies require extrinsic justifications, the charitable deduction is, for 
Andrews, intrinsic to the tax system.  It is a “matter of principle,”82 of 
conceptual integrity, and so needs no further account.  To the contrary, not 
to have the deduction would be the policy requiring justification. 
Three criticisms in particular have blunted the normative pull of 
Andrews’s theory.  First, as Professor Mark Kelman originally pointed out, 
Andrews’s definition of consumption as the preclusive appropriation of 
real economic resources is far narrower than Andrews seems to realize and 
would exclude many acts we commonly think of as consumption.83  On the 
other hand, it might include some forms of charitable giving; “looking 
altruistic,” after all, is itself a scarce resource.84  Furthermore, Andrews’s 
definition of consumption disregards the fundamental tax-law principle 
that once a taxpayer voluntarily takes dominion over resources, her 
subsequent use of those resources is irrelevant.85  Finally, as Professor 
Mark Gergen has illustrated, “all Andrews really does is to repackage the 
arguments for subsidizing charities.”86  That is, Andrews advocates 
allowing deductions for charitable gifts precisely because these gifts 
generate collective benefits (“common goods”), which, as we will see in 
Section C, is the basic subsidy theory.  Yet by avoiding the subsidy label, 
Andrews avoids doing the hard work of defining which types of collective 
benefits and which types of organizations should merit deductions.  
Subsequent scholars have also impugned Andrews’s economic neutrality 
argument by noting that economic neutrality has never been a very 
meaningful tax principle—imputed income and leisure, for example, get a 
free ride—though this argument was less important to Andrews.87 
                                                                                                                          
80 Andrews, supra note 73, at 345–46, 365–67.  For any tax-base-defining view, that is, “the 
deduction is allowed precisely because we have enacted a tax on ‘income,’ and the concept of income 
demands (or at least permits) a deduction for charitable contributions.” Johnny Rex Buckles, The 
Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 952 (2005). 
81 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 672.  
82 George F. Break, Charitable Contributions Under the Federal Individual Income Tax: 
Alternative Policy Options, in 3 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, 
RESEARCH PAPERS 1521, 1530 (1977) (summarizing Andrews’s argument). 
83 Kelman, supra note 71, at 844–46. 
84 Id. at 880. 
85 Id. at 835, 839–42.  Justice Holmes provided the classic formulation of the principle that ability 
to control the disposition of assets is the touchstone of taxability in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–
15 (1930). 
86 Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 
1416 (1988). 
87 See, e.g., Wiedenbeck, supra note 43, at 92. 
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Nevertheless, Andrews’s thesis lives on.  His article continues to frame 
scholarship on the charitable deduction, and indeed on personal deductions 
more generally, and numerous tax scholars still accept his base-defining 
rationale.88  Professor Edward McCaffery has recast Andrews as the 
founder, albeit unconsciously, of tax interpretivism.89  Professor Johnny 
Rex Buckles has recently proposed a “community income” tax-base-
defining defense of the deduction.90  John Simon has extended Andrews’s 
argument to the estate tax deduction, and linked it with income-
measurement theories of the exemption.91  Simon has also come to 
Andrews’s aid with two descriptive defenses for the base-defining 
rationale: it may not conflict with the percentage limitations on 
deductibility if these limitations are meant only as checks on “some forms 
of abuse that are correlated with donations beyond certain percentages of 
incomes or estates”;92 and it comports with the common law idea that 
money devoted to God—and much charitable giving is religious giving—
has “ceased to be under human control.”93 
B. Bittker’s Praiseworthy Donor 
In the same year that William Andrews published Personal Deductions 
in an Ideal Income Tax, fellow tax luminary Boris Bittker proposed 
another novel defense of the charitable deduction.94  While Bittker’s theory 
has not commanded the attention that Andrews’s theory has, it remains a 
foundational view.95  Like Andrews, Bittker believes that money donated 
to charity should not be counted as taxable consumption under the Haig-
Simons formula.  Unlike Andrews, however, he arrives at this conclusion 
not as a matter of logic, but as a matter of judgment.  Money donated is 
qualitatively different from money spent; it does not deserve to be taxed.  
Why not?  Because, first, by handing over her resources to charity, the 
                                                                                                                          
88 See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 86, at 1394, 1414 (discussing Andrews’s influence); McNulty, 
supra note 68, at 241–43 (embracing Andrews’s theory); William J. Turnier, Personal Deductions and 
Tax Reform: The High Road and the Low Road, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1703, 1708–09, 1726–27 (1986) 
(same). 
89 Edward J. McCaffery, Tax’s Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71, 79–80, 141–47 (1996). 
90 Buckles, supra note 80, at 970–71 (“My thesis is that community income ought not to be 
included in the individual income tax base because it is properly attributed not to individual community 
members, but to the community itself, and the community is not an appropriate object of taxation.”). 
91 John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System, PROBATE LAW, Summer 
1978, at 1, 22–23; Simon, supra note 18, at 68. 
92 Simon, supra note 18, at 74 n.8 (paraphrasing the argument in a personal memo by Professor 
Michael Krashinsky). 
93 Id. at 75–76. 
94 Bittker, supra note 70.  Bittker’s income-measurement defense of the nonprofit tax exemptions 
is even more famous.  See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit 
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). 
95 See Gergen, supra note 86, at 1394, 1426–33; Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 387, 404 n.54 (1998); McNulty, supra note 68, at 241–42 & n.55; Simon, supra note 18, at 73–
74; Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3, at 20.  
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donor loses the benefit of those resources and so is made worse-off, 
regardless of her motive for giving.96  Second, inasmuch as charitable 
contributions represent a discharge of moral obligation, they cannot be said 
to be voluntary expenditures, and as a matter of basic fairness the 
government should not tax what is not voluntary.97  And third, “something 
can be said for rewarding activities which in a certain sense are selfless, 
even if the reward serves no incentive function.”98  For Bittker, these three 
equitable considerations are necessary and sufficient to justify an unlimited 
charitable deduction, irrespective of its second-order consequences.99  
Bittker also makes several policy arguments for the deduction (that it 
enhances economic neutrality and citizen empowerment), and he defends 
against several policy criticisms (that the deduction is inefficient and 
violates progressivity), but these points were already conventional by 
1972.  The equitable arguments are what mark Bittker’s theory. 
Each of Bittker’s three equitable arguments is subject to powerful 
rebuttal.  The first argument is vulnerable to the charge that the tax system 
should not be concerned with the subjective satisfaction people get from 
their use of money and, as Bittker acknowledges, to criticism from the 
social-science crowd that charitable spending is indistinguishable from 
other forms of spending.100  The second argument, that charitable 
contributions should not be taxed because they derive from moral 
obligation, loses much of its force when one considers just how many of 
our (non-deductible) expenditures derive from some source of felt 
obligation.  Or, more powerfully, from biological obligation: there is no 
food-and-shelter deduction.  Bittker’s third equitable argument, that giving 
should be rewarded as a praiseworthy act, follows from his first two 
claims.  If by donating you are made worse off, and if there is a moral 
undergirding to this, then the act of donating looks a lot like selflessness.  
Bittker, however, never supplies the further argument needed to show why 
selflessness should command a tax break.  Wouldn’t a deduction only sully 
things? 
Yet Bittker’s equitable arguments are not completely overwhelmed by 
these criticisms.  In the years since 1972, Bittker’s notion that charitable 
giving is qualitatively different from regular spending has gained force 
among social scientists, so that the concept of “impure altruism” is now 
                                                                                                                          
96 Bittker, supra note 70, at 46–49. 
97 Id. at 58–60. 
98 Id. at 60. 
99 Id. at 62.  Bittker also defends the charitable deduction for corporations, not as a matter of 
equity but on the view that their contributions represent business expenses.  Id. at 57–58.  
100 Id. at 60.  
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widely credited.101  Selflessness commingles with social pressure, guilt, 
sympathy, and the desire for a “warm glow” in a donative calculus not 
readily reducible to rational utility maximization.102  Applying these 
insights, Mark Gergen has defended the idea that the tax system should 
take into account subjective satisfaction when feasible, and argued that 
general rules based on well-founded psychological assumptions—in this 
case, that giving money away will lead to less satisfaction than retaining 
it—can serve adequately as proxies.103   
Gergen may be Bittker’s best ally in the academy, but in the general 
public Bittker needs no reinforcement to imbue his argument with 
continued valence, for mere intuition will suffice.  At an intuitive level, 
many, if not most Americans buy his premise that charitable donors 
deserve a deduction because donated money is not consumption but 
something else, something self-sacrificial and good, and the tax code 
should honor this.104  
C. Subsidy Theories 
Andrews’s and Bittker’s theories are essentially individualistic.  As 
matters of tax logic (for Andrews) and tax equity (for Bittker), they hold 
that individual donors are owed a full deduction for all gifts to charity.  
Although Andrews and Bittker suggest that this arrangement would also be 
good for society, their donor-focused theories in no way depend on 
promotion of the social good; they are deontological defenses of the 
charitable deduction. 
For most supporters of the deduction, this is far too abstracted an 
approach.  In Congress, the courts, the media, and now academia, the 
deduction is widely viewed not as a means to reify the ideal tax base or 
reward praiseworthy donors, but as a tax expenditure used to promote 
charitable giving and thereby the ultimate well-being of society.  That is, 
                                                                                                                          
101 The economist most associated with this concept is James Andreoni.  See, e.g., James 
Andreoni, Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. 
ECON. 1447 (1989). 
102 See James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-
Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464 (1990).   
103 Gergen, supra note 86, at 1426–28.  Gergen was writing before Andreoni and so did not apply 
the “warm glow” idea specifically, but he was working off a growing literature that questioned the 
importation of economic utility maximization models into the charitable giving context.  See id. at 
1428–33. 
104 See Buckles, supra note 80, at 952 (“There seems to be a deeply held conviction in this 
country that taxpayers who donate to charity generally should not be subject to the same income tax 
liability as similarly situated taxpayers who do not.”).  In a related context, Professor Rob Atkinson has 
argued that “we are likely to be uncomfortable with theories that explain our intuitions about ‘charity’ 
out of the charitable exemption.”  Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for 
Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 399 (1997).  Professors James 
Fishman and Stephen Schwarz note that arguments from intuition have played an important role from 
the start in U.S. debates over nonprofit tax privileges.  FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 68. 
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the deduction is widely viewed as a government subsidy, which must stand 
or fall on consequentialist grounds.105  The subsidy view finds support in 
the deduction’s legislative history106 and in its structure—for instance, the 
inclusion of corporate donors and the exclusion of mutual benefit 
organizations.  The Supreme Court, moreover, has unequivocally indicated 
that it sees both the charitable deduction and the nonprofit tax exemptions 
as subsidies.  In Regan v. Taxation with Representation, the Court 
proclaimed that “[b]oth tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of 
subsidy that is administered through the tax system.  . . .  Deductible 
contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the 
individual’s contributions.”107  In the immediately following decision, Bob 
Jones University v. United States, the Court reiterated that “[w]hen the 
Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all taxpayers are 
affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for the donor means 
that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious ‘donors.’”108 
Subsidy-based arguments for the deduction, consequently, need to 
explain why the benefits of compelling “vicarious” donations—of forcing 
taxpayers to cross-subsidize each other’s charitable contributions—exceed 
the costs; they need to show why the United States would be a worse place 
if there were no charitable deduction.  This is not as straightforward a task 
as it might seem, for the deduction, as observers have long pointed out, is a 
highly atypical, highly problematic subsidy. 
The most obvious concerns are equity and fairness: only itemizing 
taxpayers, who tend to be wealthier, can claim the deduction,109 and the 
size of the deduction varies with the taxpayer’s marginal rate, meaning 
                                                                                                                          
105 See Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. 
L. REV. 687, 691 n.5 (1999) (noting that the subsidy view is the “prevailing view” and providing 
citations); Colombo, supra note 14, at 661, 682–90; Simon, supra note 18, at 74; C. Eugene Steuerle & 
Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable 
Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 399, 404 (1995).  Although not 
included along with the charitable deduction in the Joint Committee on Taxation’s or the Office of 
Management and Budget’s annual tax expenditure reports, the nonprofit tax exemptions are likewise 
now considered by many to be subsidies.  See Brody, supra, at 691 n.5; Ethan Stone, Adhering to the 
Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 
EMORY L.J. 1475, 1482 n.20 (2005); Developments in the Law—Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1578, 1620 (1992). 
106 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1983); CLOTFELTER, supra note 
3, at 31, 280 n.2; FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 672–73; Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 
3, at 23. 
107 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
108 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 591. 
109 In 2003, 29.6% of tax returns itemized charitable deductions.  AAFRC TRUST FOR 
PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 2005, at 67 tbl.1 (2005).  In dollar terms, itemizers typically account for 
around 80% of total individual donations.  See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF ALLOWING 
NONITEMIZERS TO DEDUCT CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 6 fig.1 (2002), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4008/12-13-CharitableGiving.pdf. 
 554 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:531 
 
higher earners get to deduct at higher rates.  This latter characteristic, 
critics charge, renders the deduction an “upside-down” subsidy.110  Some 
think this deviation from the ability-to-pay principle inequitable and 
undemocratic in itself; others think it inequitable and undemocratic in 
effect, as a mechanism by which the rich preserve, if not exacerbate, their 
cultural, social, and educational dominance.111  Second, unlike with most 
other matching grant programs, with the deduction the government retains 
hardly any control over its funds.  So long as the charity and the 
contribution meet the terms of § 170, the government makes the “grant” 
and lets the charity do with the money what it will.  Other than through § 
170’s categorical constraints on which organizations may receive a 
deductible gift, the deduction is in no way linked to the recipient’s quality, 
cost-effectiveness, neediness, redistributiveness, public good 
characteristics, or any other such metric.  Nor does any performance 
monitoring happen after the fact.  The inevitable result is allocative 
inefficiency: “Sectarian, provincial, eccentric, or frivolous uses of money 
may be aided along with the most worthy”112—and even if the most worthy 
organizations are, through donors’ savvy, disproportionately aided, many 
still believe it inevitable that the nonprofit sector will be less productively 
efficient than the for-profit sector owing to the former’s nondistribution 
constraint.113  Third, the subsidy is opaque, in that taxpayers never know 
which charities the government is supporting, and to what extent, through 
other taxpayers’ deductions.  Fourth, the subsidy is almost completely 
decentralized.  Within the prescribed limits, the deduction follows all 
charitable donations made by all taxpayers, so that the total subsidy 
comprises millions of uncoordinated, individualized subsidies.  Fifth, 
inasmuch as the subsidy represents state support for religious gifts—by far 
the largest category of contributions—it raises possible First Amendment 
entanglement concerns.114  Finally, some have speculated that charitable 
                                                                                                                          
110 See, e.g., Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy, and Philanthropy: The Untapped 
Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 330–31 (1997) 
(summarizing arguments that the charitable deduction is an upside-down subsidy). 
111 See, e.g., TERESA ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME: GENEROSITY AND SELF-INTEREST 
AMONG THE PHILANTHROPIC ELITE 232–40 (1990).  Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus of the Czech 
Republic apparently railed against charitable deductions as undemocratic in the early 1990s.  Salamon 
& Flaherty, supra note 39, at 27. 
112 RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 162 (rev. ed. 1976). 
113 See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the 
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 535 (1996); Hansmann, 
Economic Theories, supra note 24, at 38.  The nondistribution constraint refers to the statutory bar 
preventing nonprofits from distributing residual earnings to owners.  As the Supreme Court has noted, 
most nonprofit scholars now follow Hansmann in identifying it as the defining characteristic of 
nonprofit organizations.  Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675 n.6 (1990). 
114 See Surrey, supra note 71, at 714 n.9 (arguing that the tax expenditures occasioned by the 
charitable deduction should be seen as equivalent to direct government subsidies for Establishment 
Clause purposes).  For an overview of the law governing the deductibility of gifts to religious 
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giving, tethered as it is to a rich amalgam of moral, religious, and 
communal norms, is tax-price inelastic, so that deductions will do little to 
increase charitable giving, though they may do quite a lot to distort or 
trivialize it.115 
On ethical, pragmatic, and constitutional levels, then, the charitable 
deduction appears to be a particularly vexing form of subsidy.  Yet most 
subsidy theorists, including the Supreme Court, have defended the 
deduction on account of its “community benefits” or “public benefits.”116  
All subsidy theories start from the proposition that, on account of market 
failures and government failures, certain public goods provided by 
nonprofits will be underfunded in the absence of legislative intervention.117  
From this baseline insight, they must then show that the deduction creates 
benefits to the community sufficient to outweigh whatever inefficiencies, 
inequities, improprieties, or revenue losses it might engender, and 
sufficient to make it more attractive than alternative forms of intervention. 
The community benefit literature is as heterogeneous as it is 
voluminous, and has never before been systematically parsed.  There are 
two main types of community benefit theories: theories that emphasize the 
deduction’s benefits to the government, in the form of reduced 
programmatic or revenue burden; and theories that emphasize the 
deduction’s benefits to the broader public, in the form of increased social 
welfare, redistribution, pluralism, or some other such desideratum.  The 
first set of theories falls under the rubric of “treasury efficiency.”  The 
second set of theories falls under no established analytic frame.  I offer 
                                                                                                                          
organizations, see Allan J. Samansky, Deductibility of Contributions to Religious Institutions, 24 VA. 
TAX REV. 65 (2004). 
115 See Brody, supra note 105, at 715–17; William S. Vickrey, One Economist’s View of 
Philanthropy, in PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC POLICY 31, 56 (Frank G. Dickinson ed., 1962). 
116 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 692; SALAMON, supra note 9, at 3–4; Colombo, 
supra note 14, at 692; Simon, supra note 18, at 75–76; Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3, at 23–34.  
The Supreme Court has used the term “public benefit.”  See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574, 591–92 (1983).  I prefer “community benefit,” the Treasury standard for granting 
organizations § 501(c)(3) status, see Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, because it better conveys how 
these inquiries are implicitly bounded by the notion of a relevant community.  The origins of the 
Treasury’s community benefit standard date back to late-19th-century English common law.  FISHMAN 
& SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 121. 
117 I discuss the major government failure theories infra Part III.C.2.  For a succinct summary of 
the market failures to which nonprofit organizations respond, see Avner Ben-Ner & Benedetto Gui, The 
Theory of Nonprofit Organizations Revisited, in THE STUDY OF NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE: THEORIES 
AND APPROACHES 3, 5–16 (Helmut K. Anheier & Avner Ben-Ner eds., 2003); and Nina J. Crimm, An 
Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk 
Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 440–43 (1998).  The most conspicuous of these market failures 
are (1) producers’ inability to prevent freeriding for nonrival, nonexcuslive goods; (2) producers’ and 
consumers’ disinclination to internalize the externalities generated by their behavior; and (3) 
information asymmetries that prevent consumers from being able to trust for-profit firms to provide 
certain goods and services in sufficient quality or quantity. 
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here what I believe to be the most productive taxonomy, disaggregating 
these theories by their underlying normative commitments—utilitarianism, 
distributive justice, or communitarianism.118  All of the subsidy theories 
share an instrumental approach: they support the charitable deduction 
inasmuch as it generates the desired extrinsic outcome, and no further.  
And all of these theories, it bears repeating, are partial theories—
inadequate to justify the charitable deduction in its present form, silent on 
the appropriate status of internationally-targeted donations. 
1. Treasury Efficiency 
The oldest and most determinate of the subsidy theories rests on the 
notion that the deduction indirectly generates charitable goods and services 
that the government would otherwise have to pay for directly.  We saw this 
replacement-of-government-burdens notion earlier, in the legislative 
history of the water’s edge policy, where the House Report stipulated: 
“The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable 
and other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is 
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden 
which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public 
funds.”119  I noted then that, as a justification for the charitable deduction, 
the replacement-of-government-burdens argument is both over- and under-
inclusive.120  Nonetheless, it contains a core of truth.  If the charitable 
deduction did not exist, the evidence we have on donor tax-price 
elasticities—estimated in most empirical studies to have an absolute value 
greater than 1.0—suggests that overall contributions would decline by 25% 
or more.121  Many nonprofits would have to contract.  Some might fold.  
                                                                                                                          
118 Utilitarianism, distributive justice, and communitarianism are, of course, major philosophic 
constructs, and I am only able to treat them here in a general fashion.  This is not such a problem, 
however, because that is how they have been invoked in the deduction literature—as general normative 
guides, not as rigorous principles of tax policy.  I aim to make explicit in this Section the way in which 
these constructs have implicitly undergirded much of subsidy theory. 
119 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19–20 (1938); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
Many courts and commentators have subsequently echoed this argument, for the exemptions as well as 
the deduction.  See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 68, 71, 672–73; Chang et al., supra note 
40, at 567; Salamon & Flaherty, supra note 39, at 28–29; Wiedenbeck, supra note 43, at 93–95.  
120 See supra Part II.C. (penultimate paragraph). 
121 Although there is some disagreement between panel studies and cross-section time-series 
studies, most research has found donor tax-price elasticities in the –1.0 to –1.5 range, with averages 
around –1.25 and wealthier donors more price-sensitive.  For summaries of the literature, see 
CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 49–63; Aprill, supra note 25, at 857–59; Christopher Jencks, Who Gives 
to What?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 18, at 321, 328–32; Richard S. Steinberg, Economic 
Theories of Nonprofit Organizations: An Evaluation, in THE STUDY OF NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE, supra 
note 117, at 277, 283–84; and Wiedenbeck supra note 43, at 95 n.41.  Fishman and Schwarz indicate 
that in 2001 individuals and corporations together gave $170 billion to charity, while in 2003 they 
received $41 billion in income tax savings from the deduction.  FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, 
at 12 tbl.1.2, 689.  If one estimates that 80% of the $161 billion in individual donations came from 
itemizers, see supra note 109, that puts the ratio of deduction savings (~$40 billion) to total deductible 
giving (~$130 billion) at approximately 30%.  This figure would be higher if gift, estate, and state tax 
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Given the public good character of much nonprofit activity and the United 
States’ intense reliance on the nonprofit sector for the provision of basic 
social services,122 the resultant level of nonprofit activity would be both 
economically suboptimal and, for some citizens, a threat to sustenance.  
The government would face severe political pressure to make up for at 
least some of the sector’s contraction though direct subsidies or direct 
provision.  Either way, the revenue savings from cutting the deduction 
would be eroded. 
Implicit in the findings that donor tax-price elasticities exceed 1.0 (in 
absolute value) is the existence of treasury efficiency, the idea that the 
deduction stimulates more in donations than it consumes in tax revenue.123  
The economic theory behind treasury efficiency is straightforward.  Tax 
inducements such as the charitable deduction generally have income and 
substitution effects, both of which should increase giving if it is a normal 
good.  The greater the elasticity of giving, the more additional giving will 
occur per dollar of lost tax revenue, and so the greater the treasury 
efficiency.124 
This line of argument bolsters the case for the deduction, but not by 
much.  Treasury efficiency is a very narrow form of efficiency.  It suggests 
that the deduction maximizes the ratio of charitable giving to government 
spending, but fails to address the more significant ratio of charitable output 
to total spending—what might be termed investment efficiency.  If 
transaction costs associated with the deduction are sufficiently high, 
treasury efficiency and investment efficiency may diverge.  Nonprofit 
organizations often spend a high proportion of their budgets on fundraising 
                                                                                                                          
deductions were included.  Assuming (conservatively) an average tax-price elasticity of –1.0, 
elimination of the deduction would, ceteris paribus, decrease charitable giving by the same 30%.  This 
calculation is crude, but the result is in line with Charles Clotfelter’s and Martin Feldstein’s 
econometric simulations of the effects of repealing the deduction, which predict that total giving would 
fall by about one quarter.  CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 100–41; Martin Feldstein, The Income Tax 
and Charitable Contributions (pts. 1 & 2), 28 NAT’L TAX J. 81, 209 (1975).  
122 See Sokolowski & Salamon, supra note 4 (describing the U.S. nonprofit sector in comparative 
context). 
123 The treasury efficiency idea was first advanced by William Vickrey in Vickrey, supra note 
115, and most fully developed by Martin Feldstein in Feldstein, supra note 121.  Many now cite it in 
defense of the charitable deduction.  See, e.g., CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 281; Don Fullerton & 
Shira D. Goodman, The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981: Implications for Charitable Giving, 16 
TAX NOTES 1027, 1028 (1982); Gergen, supra note 86, at 1404; Wiedenbeck, supra note 43, at 95–96; 
INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLIC POLICY ON CHARITABLE GIVING 6 (2001), 
http://www.independentsector.org/programs/gr/GuidingPrinciples.pdf. 
124 More sophisticated proponents of treasury efficiency compare the deduction to the financing of 
nonprofits through tax-funded government grants, and argue that donations are sufficiently price-elastic 
and crowding out sufficiently large that the deduction generates higher nonprofit revenues per tax 
dollar.  See Steinberg, supra note 121, at 295 (summarizing econometric studies). 
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and administration.125  By decentralizing the allocation of charitable 
contributions, the deduction reduces the government’s administrative costs, 
but it drives up nonprofits’ overhead by magnifying the importance of 
broad-based public fundraising.  Hence, while tax scholars who support the 
charitable deduction have often touted it as a low-cost means to subsidize 
giving,126 it is at least plausible that a direct subsidy or direct provision 
alternative would have superior investment efficiency. 
2. Utilitarianism 
Investment efficiency may be a more meaningful evaluative construct 
than treasury efficiency, but it too provides a limited window onto the 
desirability of the deduction.  A more robust conception of efficiency, 
notes Mark Gergen, would look to see “not how much extra money is spent 
on charity as a result of a deduction [but] rather, how much people benefit 
from that extra expenditure compared to the alternative use of the lost 
revenues.”127  This aggregate cost-benefit analysis is a utilitarian inquiry; 
the normative criterion on which it evaluates the deduction is social 
welfare maximization.  It is by now the most important theory of the 
deduction in the literature.128 
Scholars who have defended the deduction on utilitarian grounds—
almost never explicitly, for deduction theorists have been coy about their 
normative premises129—have raised two main arguments.  The first 
concerns the mix of goods and services generated by the deduction.  
Professor Burton Weisbrod has famously argued that because government 
entities in a majoritarian democracy tend to provide public goods only at 
the level that satisfies the median voter, nonprofit organizations arise to 
fulfill residual demand with supplementary provision.130  Nonprofits, and 
                                                                                                                          
125 The National Center for Charitable Statistics notes that watchdog groups typically recommend 
that nonprofits spend no more than 40% or 50% of their annual revenues on fundraising and 
administration.  NCCS FAQs, http://nccsdataweburban.org/FAQ/fDetail.php?category=48&itemID 
=409 (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).  That this is the benchmark implies that a not insignificant percentage 
of nonprofits spend 40% or more on overhead.  
126 See sources cited supra note 123. 
127 Gergen, supra note 86, at 1404; see also CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 281 (echoing Gergen’s 
call to widen the efficiency inquiry); Wiedenbeck, supra note 43, at 95 & n.41 (same).  
128 A more accurate label for the family of theories discussed in this Subsection might be 
“consequentialism,” given that classical utilitarianism posits a single metric of social welfare, and 
happiness, wealth, human flourishing, and preference satisfaction (among others) are all plausible 
grounds on which to justify the charitable deduction.  I stick with “utilitarianism” because of its 
familiarity and because I want to distinguish this set of theories—which largely focus on the efficient 
provision of public goods, see Gergen, supra note 86, at 1394—from the distributive and 
communitarian theories discussed in the following Subsections. 
129 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
130 Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector 
Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975).  But 
cf. Hansmann, Economic Theories, supra note 24, at 28–29 (discussing the two main problems with 
Weisbrod’s theory: many nonprofits seem to provide private, not public goods—especially commercial 
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the deductions that support them, correct for government failure by 
facilitating the closer matching of voter preferences.  The more 
heterogeneous the community, the more value nonprofits will add.  The 
charitable deduction also corrects for another form of governmental failure, 
by stimulating the production of goods and services that are widely 
demanded but that the government is constrained from providing by the 
Constitution (as with religion) or by its very nature (as with monitoring and 
criticism of the government itself).131  In its facilitation of a larger, richer 
mix of public goods than the government alone would provide, the 
deduction’s opaqueness may prove a virtue.  The reality of taxpayers being 
coerced into supporting each other’s pet causes—some of which they may 
not care for, some of which they may positively dislike—is masked by the 
deduction’s decentralized operation.  As a matter of game theory and 
practical politics, this opacity likely makes the deduction a more effective 
broker of compromise, and a more powerful enhancer of social welfare, 
than a more explicit process would be.132 
The second main strain of utilitarian argument for the charitable 
deduction focuses not on the quantity and type of outputs that the 
deduction supports, but on the quality of these outputs.  As a market-based 
mechanism for allocating the subsidy, the deduction spurs nonprofits to 
compete for donations from individual donors, rather than from a 
centralized charity apparat.  If individual donors are reasonable judges of 
nonprofit performance, higher-quality organizations should benefit from 
this system.  And, indeed, the deduction helps turn donors into better 
judges of performance because it empowers them as consumers and raises 
the stakes of their decisional role.  The deduction’s “ongoing” nature also 
enhances decisionmaking, Professor Saul Levmore has argued, by allowing 
the uncertain donor to “receive information regarding charities’ receipts as 
the year progresses” and thereby assess in a dynamic process which 
                                                                                                                          
nonprofits, whose share of the sector has risen; and the theory does not explain why nonprofit, rather 
than for-profit firms fill the unsatisfied demand). 
131 See Bittker, supra note 70, at 40–42; Simon, supra note 18, at 76; William Vickrey, Private 
Philanthropy and Public Finance, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 130, 
at 149, 158–59.  Yet another form of governmental failure (related to Weisbrod’s median voter problem 
but arguably distinct) that the charitable deduction may help to remedy is the political and bureaucratic 
tendency to emphasize immediate, quantifiable results, at the expense of public goods that yield diffuse 
benefits over a long time horizon.  It is unlikely that the United States’ liberal arts system of higher 
education, for example, would have turned out so stable and robust if not for the deduction’s support of 
private philanthropy to universities. 
132 On the game theory of the deduction, see Vickrey, supra note 131, at 163.  On the deduction’s 
opaqueness as a useful tool for forging difficult compromises, see Estelle James, Discussant Remarks 
and Audience Questions, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 829, 830–32 (1988–89) (responding to Henry 
Hansmann’s symposium paper); Amartya Sen, Comment, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC 
THEORY, supra note 130, at 225; and Wiedenbeck, supra note 43, at 101. 
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charities would be able to use her donation most effectively.133  In addition, 
the deduction incorporates two legal checks on quality in the utilitarian 
sense of aggregate welfare effects.  The common law “public policy” 
doctrine, articulated by the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. 
United States, disallows deductions for gifts to organizations that violate 
fundamental public policies such as racial nondiscrimination.134  The 
statutory prohibition on deductions for gifts to political or lobbying 
organizations, meanwhile, prevents subsidies from flowing to causes that 
will have a predictably widespread, mobilized opposition—causes whose 
furtherance will substantially decrease as well as increase social welfare.135  
The nonpartisan charities that garner the vast majority of the deduction 
subsidy are more likely to command a broad base of support or, at least, 
not to arouse a broad base of opposition. 
Combining these two strains of utilitarian argument, the deduction is 
seen to foster community benefits by generating a greater quantity, quality, 
and diversity of public goods than would result in its absence.  Although it 
is practically impossible to measure these benefits or even to locate their 
recipients,136 the basic argument is sensible: the nonprofit activity 
facilitated by the deduction contributes to the increase of social welfare 
both by fulfilling the demand schedules of a greater number of individuals 
(a pluralism of ends) and by generating innovation and experimentation in 
the delivery of goods and services, thereby spurring the marketplace to 
higher-quality modes of production (a pluralism of means).  But the 
utilitarian defense of the deduction is vulnerable at the level of fact as well 
as the level of political ethics. 
At the level of fact, aspects of the deduction work to decrease, not 
increase, social welfare.  Subsidizing nonprofits clashes with our general 
preference for majoritarian governance and may exacerbate factionalism; it 
increases the flow of funds to a charitable marketplace that may be neither 
productively efficient nor amenable to objective quality control; it raises 
serious equity concerns and may inspire resentment over the reinforcement 
of cultural, social, and economic hierarchies; and if social welfare 
maximization is the goal, it is unclear why private benefit transactions are 
                                                                                                                          
133 Levmore, supra note 95, at 411. 
134 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591–92 (1983). 
135 As I note in the following Subsection on distributive justice, a more compelling justification 
for the exclusion of political activity—a classic, if costly public good—is the concern not to subsidize 
disproportionately the politics of the rich.  But the utilitarian interpretation may help explain why the 
government does not provide a more equitable (“right-side-up”) subsidy for political contributions, as 
through a tax credit. 
136 See Andrews, supra note 73, at 314; Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit 
Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 86 (1981); Wiedenbeck, supra note 
43, at 89 (“Obviously any attempt to allocate the benefits conferred by charitable organizations would 
quickly become hopeless or arbitrary—who benefits, and in what degree, from basic scientific research, 
or a liberal college education, or the community conscience instilled by religious institutions?”). 
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prohibited or why the deduction is subject to percentage limits.  More 
fundamentally, the deduction is in no way linked to the degree to which the 
donee needs subsidization (for example, because of its outputs’ 
susceptibility to freeriding) or the degree to which the donee may be 
expected to create collective benefits.  This is, for the efficiency-minded, 
the scandal of the charitable deduction: if § 170 aspires to rule 
utilitarianism, it is hard to discern the logic behind its choice of rules. 
Except for a crude public charity qualification, the deduction does not 
try to identify organizations—much less activities or units within 
organizations—that will make best use of the subsidy.137  To the contrary, 
it supports many nonprofits known to generate little in the way of 
collective benefits, either because they carry high overheads or because 
their benefits are largely confined to a narrow class of patrons.  Think of an 
opera house, for example, or indeed of most cultural institutions located in 
affluent neighborhoods.  Moreover, not only does the deduction fail to 
target organizations that generate widespread or deep increases in social 
welfare; the subsidy it compels also in certain cases serves to decrease 
welfare.  Because of the presence of “radically or marginally disinterested 
parties,” as Mark Gergen observes, the “deduction never can be justified as 
a Pareto improvement” that makes some better off and none worse off, and 
is only justifiable to the utilitarian, if at all, under the less demanding 
Kaldor-Hicks standard of net welfare improvement.138 
This is a significant concession.  At the level of ethico-political theory, 
of course, not everyone accepts the utilitarian telos of social welfare 
maximization, for tax or any other policy.  Adopting a Kaldor-Hicks 
standard, as a utilitarian proponent of the deduction must, is especially 
problematic.  Even if this proponent believes that meaningful data can be 
gleaned on who benefits from the deduction and to what extent, and that 
the deduction’s net benefits exceed that of any alternative policy—
contestable beliefs, both—she still has to reckon with the existence of 
                                                                                                                          
137 In the context of the nonprofit tax exemptions, Professors Mark Hall and John Colombo have 
argued that an organization’s donation-dependence (or “donativeness,” see supra note 24) offers the 
best metric for evaluating its claim to subsidy.  Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable 
Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307 
(1991) [hereinafter Hall & Colombo, Charitable Status]; Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The 
Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991) [hereinafter Hall & 
Colombo, Donative Theory].  Because the deduction, even more directly than the exemptions, will tend 
to reward noncommercial organizations, one could likewise envision § 170 as using donative thickness 
as a proxy for subsidy deservedness.  But § 170 does not actually tie the deduction to donativeness, and 
there is no reason to believe that a more centralized method of allocating the charitable subsidy would 
not, on average, target relatively more donative recipients. 
138 Gergen, supra note 86, at 1412.  As Gergen explains, the Kaldor-Hicks inquiry asks “whether 
winners under the policy [in question] gain enough in dollars to pay off the losers and still be ahead.  
(Actual payment is not required.)  If winners win more than losers lose, a policy is a Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement.  If no further improvement is possible a position is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.”  Id. 
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taxpayers who will disapprove of various organizations (and various 
donors) being supported by their money.  Many observers—almost all 
libertarians, for instance—reject as unethical the Kaldor-Hicks assumption 
that the state may injure one person if doing so benefits another person 
more.139  While virtually any tax policy will disbenefit some group, the 
charitable deduction’s exceptionally permissive, pluralistic system for 
allocating its subsidy renders exceptionally stark its deviation from the 
Pareto ideal.  Morally and empirically, the utilitarian defender of the 
deduction is on shaky ground. 
3. Distributive Justice 
In response to several of the weaknesses in the utilitarian position, 
some proponents of the charitable deduction have shifted the emphasis 
from the utility of the entire society to the utility of its worst-off members.  
Professors Thomas Griffith and Anthony Atkinson have explicitly made 
this “Rawlsian” move; many others have incorporated elements of 
distributive justice sub silentio into their theories of the deduction.140  
Griffith offers a stylized utility model to demonstrate how the deduction 
might satisfy Rawls’s maximin principle, which “ranks social states 
according to the welfare of the least well-off individual in the social state” 
rather than weighting everyone’s welfare equally.141  The maximin 
principle preserves the welfarist ethic of utilitarianism and the view of 
social welfare as the summation of individual welfare functions—two 
premises which, again, some find suspect—but in evaluating public 
policies it assigns lexical priority to their effects on underprivileged 
groups.  The question for the charitable deduction thus becomes: to what 
extent does it foster the advancement of or redistribution to these groups 
relative to alternative policies? 
In what should by now be a familiar theme, the answer to this question 
is unclear.  On the one hand, the tax savings produced by the deduction 
accrue disproportionately to the wealthiest taxpayers (and not at all to 
                                                                                                                          
139 See id. at 1413.  But cf. Hall & Colombo, Donative Theory, supra note 137, at 1428–30 
(arguing, counterintuitively, that a libertarian in the mold of Robert Nozick would approve of tax 
exemptions for sufficiently donative nonprofits). 
140 A.B. Atkinson, The Income Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, in PUBLIC AND 
URBAN ECONOMICS 13 (Ronald E. Grieson ed., 1976); Griffith, supra note 72; see also Simon, Dale & 
Chisolm, supra note 3, at 30–37 (synopsizing the role of redistribution in theories of the nonprofit 
sector and of the charitable deduction).  My warning about the looseness of the philosophical terms 
employed in this Part, see supra note 118, may be particularly apt here.  Unlike Professors Griffith and 
Atkinson, most deduction theorists concerned with distributional effects have not actually engaged 
distributive justice as a systemic concept.  I classify these arguments under “distributive justice,” rather 
than “redistribution,” not to suggest any well-developed theory of procedural fairness or 
consequentialist desert, but rather to signify a normative commitment to progressive resource 
redistribution and to the charitable deduction as a vehicle thereof. 
141 Griffith, supra note 72, at 386 (recapitulating JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75, 152–54 
(1971)). 
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those taxpayers who do not itemize), and many of the organizations that 
benefit from the deduction cater primarily to the wealthy.142  Think once 
again of the opera house, the quintessential exemplar of a non-
redistributive “public charity.”143  A significant portion of charitable 
contributions from wealthy donors goes to universities and cultural 
institutions144—organizations that generate significant positive externalities 
but that do not do very much redistribution.  Lower-income donors, by 
contrast, give mainly to local churches and community welfare 
agencies145—organizations that generate more bounded positive 
externalities but that tend to be more focused on the needy.  The 
deduction’s upside-down effect, accordingly, may on balance be good for 
utilitarianism, bad for distributive justice.  Western European countries 
offer a suggestive counterexample to Rawlsian deduction theories: these 
countries have weaker deduction systems than the United States yet 
stronger social safety nets for their poor.146 
On the other hand, many charities subsidized by the deduction do cater 
to worse-off persons and thereby effect a progressive redistribution of 
resources.  For every opera house in America, there are thousands of social 
welfare organizations.  Section 170’s exclusion of political contributions 
prevents the rich from (directly) using the deduction to magnify their 
political clout.147  The prohibition on quid pro quo transactions guarantees 
at least a minimal degree of redistribution by channeling contributions 
toward activities that will benefit others, most often others who are of 
equal or lesser financial and social status relative to the donor.  The 
Supreme Court’s public policy doctrine ensures that the deduction will not 
subsidize racially discriminatory organizations.148  If there were no 
deduction, as mentioned above, the evidence on donor tax-price elasticities 
                                                                                                                          
142 See generally WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 
1992). 
143 While there are many types of nonprofits eligible to receive deductible gifts whose benefits are 
clearly non-redistributive, opera houses have come in for especially rough treatment in the literature.  
See, e.g., Brody, supra note 105, at 760; Colombo, supra note 14, at 670; Hansmann, Nonprofit 
Enterprise, supra note 24, at 856–57.  This characterization of opera’s beneficiaries may not be entirely 
fair: Martha Nussbaum notes that “[m]ost opera companies have extensive programs in the public 
schools” and that certain opera houses have focused on working-class audiences.  E-mail from Martha 
Nussbaum, Professor, University of Chicago, to David Pozen (June 30, 2006, 2:12 PM) (on file with 
Connecticut Law Review). 
144 There is a vast literature on Americans’ giving patterns.  For a concise summary of the class 
disparities and citations to studies, see Bullock, supra note 110, at 342–44. 
145 Id. at 344. 
146 See Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy, 
41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 287, 295 & n.35 (2000). 
147 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2000). 
148 See supra text accompanying note 134 (explaining the Supreme Court’s holding in Bob Jones 
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)).  
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suggests that less money overall would go to charity.149  And of the charity 
that would remain, it is not clear that it would be distributed as 
progressively.  Saul Levmore has argued that the more control taxpayers 
exert over the objects of their munificence, the more likely they may be to 
tolerate redistribution and spending on public goods.150  Taxpayer 
empowerment, Levmore surmises, promotes the ends of distributive 
justice—and perhaps makes the deduction comport with a relaxed maximin 
principle.  In this view, the “redistribution strategy” embodied in the 
charitable deduction can be seen not as a regressive ruse, but “as a 
precommitment device by a majority that knows that when left to its 
private devices it is not so mean-spirited after all.”151 
4. Communitarianism 
Whether explicitly or implicitly, most nonprofit tax scholars and 
policymakers have operated from a normative baseline that is liberal 
welfarist—usually utilitarian, sometimes (quasi-)Rawlsian.152  There is, 
however, another major normative thrust in the literature, hinted at by 
countless writers yet even less fleshed out than the others, that supports the 
deduction without advancing the view of social welfare as an exclusive 
function of individual welfare.  It is communitarianism. 
Under an assortment of labels like “sociological” benefits,153 
“secondary benefits,”154 and “metabenefits,”155 commentators have hailed 
the community benefits generated by the deduction and the exemptions 
that do not fit neatly into an efficiency framework.  These benefits include 
organizational pluralism, altruism, sovereignty, and stability.  Pluralism 
results from the decentralization of charitable funding and provision;156 
altruism from the government’s symbolic and pecuniary reinforcement of 
                                                                                                                          
149 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
150 Levmore, supra note 95, at 406. 
151 Id. 
152 See Griffith, supra note 72, at 386–87.  Of course, I (like Griffith) mean this in a generalized 
sense; most tax analysts do not actually assess policies with reference to Rawls’s Theory of Justice or 
Mill’s Utilitarianism.  Cf. supra notes 118, 140. 
153 Colombo, supra note 14, at 692. 
154 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 68; Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3, at 24–26; 
see also Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Special Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations, in FEDERAL 
AND STATE TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 15.04[1] (Frances R. Hill & Barbara L. 
Kirschten eds., 1994) (suggesting a parallel between “secondary-benefit theories” of the income tax 
exemption and the charitable deduction). 
155 Atkinson, supra note 104, at 414–30. 
156 Pluralism has been the most ballyhooed of the sociological/secondary benefits.  See id. at 403 
& n.22 (providing citations); Levmore, supra note 95, at 404 n.54; Simon et al., supra note 3, at 24 
(“The virtue of the nonprofit sector that is, perhaps, most often put forth as a secondary benefit worthy 
of support is pluralism.”); Turnier, supra note 88, at 1723, 1728–29; Wiedenbeck, supra note 43, at 96–
97. 
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giving;157 sovereignty from the government’s subsidizing the nonprofit 
sector with only minimal regulation and oversight—treating it almost as a 
co-equal “third sector”;158 stability from the preservation of a decades-old 
policy tradition in the face of enormous sectoral and societal change.159  
For many commentators, these values are seen both as inherently 
meritorious (and worthy of subsidy) and as conducive to second-order 
values such as the creation of a kinder, gentler, more self-reliant populace 
and a richer, livelier, more participatory civil society—values which, in 
turn, support still higher-level values such as enhanced capacity for 
collective self-determination and increased levels of social capital.  All of 
these benefits may well serve to increase prosperity and/or distributive 
justice in the long run and thereby feed back into utilitarian and Rawlsian 
arguments for the deduction.  But they are more often praised without 
resort to either argument. 
While the “sociological benefits” of the charitable deduction thus serve 
diverse ends and have been applauded by commentators of diverse 
ideological sensibilities, the normative framework that best encapsulates 
them is communitarianism.  (Pluralism is the most difficult benefit to 
encapsulate because of its strong appeal across much of the ideological 
spectrum; my claim is that deduction theorists who have celebrated 
pluralism on grounds other than welfare maximization have tended to 
emphasize the communitarian values of local community building, cultural 
particularism, civic engagement, and republican public-spiritedness more 
than, say, the liberal values of choice, self-reliance, and private ordering.)  
Communitarian theories come in many varieties, but they share the 
common insight that human subjectivity is constituted by multiple, 
overlapping value sources, ranging from one’s family and friends to the 
national and international order.160  Within this schema, voluntary 
organizations play a crucial role mediating between lower- and higher-
level value sources, between thicker, organic communities and thinner, 
politically constructed communities.  Voluntary organizations, for the 
communitarian, provide unique spaces for the formation of communal 
relationships and morals and for the preservation of communal traditions 
                                                                                                                          
157 See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990); Gergen, 
supra note 86, at 1426–33.  But cf. Colombo, supra note 14, at 691 (expressing skepticism that the 
deduction and exemption are able “to recognize altruistic behavior as opposed to selfish behavior”). 
158 See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 
23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998). 
159 See Simon, supra note 18, at 84; Stone, supra note 105, at 1537–38. 
160 See Josh Chafetz, Social Reproduction and Religious Reproduction: A Democratic-
Communitarian Analysis of the Yoder Problem, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2006) 
(manuscript at 35, on file with Connecticut Law Review). 
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and identities;161 they are necessary, though not sufficient, for human 
flourishing.  By displacing the provision of public goods from the 
government sector to the nonprofit sector and by empowering and 
affirming charitable giving, the deduction fosters not only pluralism, 
altruism, sovereignty, and stability, but also the social solidarity, personal 
responsibility, and civic virtue that are the core values of the 
communitarian program. 
Or, at least, the deduction would do so in an ideal world.  Not all 
nonprofits breed civic virtue and social harmony; some nonprofits trumpet 
extreme voices or special interests and thereby exacerbate factionalism, the 
“dark side” of civic engagement.162  The charitable deduction, of course, 
makes no effort to distinguish between these two breeds of recipient.163  
Because nonprofits have increasingly moved from local membership-based 
organizations to virtual advocacy organizations, their ability to enrich 
communal relationships and generate social capital has waned at the same 
time that their ability to polarize has grown.164  As a result, the deduction 
may be increasingly supporting less deserving organizations: it may be 
fostering the wrong kind of civil society, no matter how flush with cash.  
Add to this concern the standard allegations that the deduction acts to 
perpetuate elite domination (undermining social solidarity), to cheapen the 
act of giving (undermining personal responsibility), and to decrease the 
amount of volunteerism (undermining civic virtue), and the deduction 
begins to look less like a communitarian godsend and more like a 
communitarian nightmare. 
As with utilitarian and Rawlsian theories of the deduction, there is a 
problem here at the level of ethico-political theory as well as the level of 
fact.  Factually, as just suggested, it is unclear whether the deduction really 
does promote communitarian-friendly organizations.  Theoretically, it is 
unclear whether, even if the deduction does do a better job than alternative 
policies of actualizing communitarian values, these values should trump 
the utilitarian concern with efficiency or the social-contractarian concern 
                                                                                                                          
161 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Introduction to THE COMMUNITARIAN READER: BEYOND THE 
ESSENTIALS 1, 5 (Amitai Etzioni et al. eds., 2004); Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and 
Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 735–36, 
800–01 (2005); see also Miriam Galston, Civic Renewal and the Regulation of Nonprofits, 13 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289 (2004) (analyzing at great depth the relationship between nonprofit 
regulation and civic health). 
162 Morris P. Fiorina, Extreme Voices: A Dark Side of Civic Engagement, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 395 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds., 1999). 
163 The charitable deduction also, of course, makes no effort to recognize for-profit donees at all, 
though they too can advance communitarian values, especially with respect to pluralism in the 
provision of public goods.  See Gergen, supra note 86, at 1410. 
164 See Theda Skocpol, Advocates Without Members: The Recent Transformation of American 
Civic Life, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 162, at 461.  See generally 
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY chs. 
3, 7 (2000). 
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with distributive justice.  The tension between organizational pluralism and 
social welfare is perhaps the most obvious, for the nonprofit marketplace 
does not weed out laggards like the for-profit marketplace, and the pluralist 
tent will inevitably embrace groups that are inefficient, extremist, and 
redundant.165  This tension surfaced dramatically in the Supreme Court’s 
Bob Jones decision, where Justice Powell, in concurrence, expressed 
skepticism that many nonprofits provide “a clear ‘public benefit’ as 
defined by the Court” yet nevertheless expressed his support for their 
subsidy, because these organizations provide an “indispensable means of 
limiting the influence of governmental orthodoxy on important areas of 
community life.”166  That no other Justices joined Powell’s opinion reflects 
how many deduction (and exemption) supporters are unwilling to sanction 
the categorical elevation of heterodoxy, or any other specific benefit, over 
the others. 
IV.  DEDUCTION THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL CHARITY 
Having summarized the literature on the charitable deduction and 
drawn out its normative premises, I seek in this Part to complexify—and 
advance—the debate by internationalizing it.  To be able to make this 
move, Section A first provides an overview of internationally-targeted 
donations: who donates abroad, to which organizations, and why.  
Applying the analytic taxonomy developed above, Section B evaluates the 
significance of cross-border giving under each of the leading theories.  (I 
reserve for Part V considerations of whether alternative non-tax policies, 
such as greater direct government spending on foreign aid, might be more 
or less attractive than the current water’s edge deduction scheme.)  My aim 
in Section B is to draw out the most significant ways in which the 
deduction theories illuminate the question of foreign giving and, 
conversely, to draw out the most significant ways in which this question 
illuminates the theories.  
The subsidy theories pose an added challenge here as compared to 
Andrews’s and Bittker’s arguments, because in all consequentialist 
theories of the deduction, a crucial, yet heretofore overlooked threshold 
question arises over how to define the population of interest.  The use of 
the heading “community benefit” (or “public benefit”) to encapsulate what 
we are seeking from the subsidy begs not only the question of what are the 
                                                                                                                          
165 See GOODE, supra note 112, at 160–62 (discussing the tension between pluralism and 
“waste”).  This is the downside of pluralism for the utilitarian, for whom, as I described in supra Part 
III.C.2, the pluralisms of means and ends stimulated by the deduction are often promoted as major 
selling points. 
166 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 608–09 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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benefits—the question to which tax scholars have addressed their 
attention—but also the question of what is the community (or public) 
whose members are to be benefited.  There are two words in “community 
benefit.”  Incorporating foreign giving into the analysis underscores the 
normative and empirical problematics lurking in the first. 
A. What Do Internationally-Targeted Donations Look Like? 
Before applying the theories of the deduction to internationally-
targeted donations, it is useful to consider how these donations compare to 
domestically-targeted donations, the ideal type around which the theories 
have been constructed.  This comparison cannot be made too specific 
because data are spotty on the distribution and magnitude of 
internationally-targeted giving, both with regard to contributors and 
beneficiaries.  Only a tiny fraction of foreign charities are registered with 
the IRS,167 the government does not require domestic charities to report 
their international activities in any systematic way, and no researchers 
appear to have compiled macro-statistics on the programs that U.S.-based 
nonprofits support overseas.  Nevertheless, the evidence that exists, 
supplemented by anecdote and common sense, permits some general 
observations about the distinctive features of internationally-targeted 
donations.  
As discussed in Part II, the recipients of internationally-targeted 
donations may be U.S.-based organizations that do charitable work abroad 
or foreign charities that receive re-transmitted funds from U.S.-based 
intermediaries.  American donors may also give directly to foreign 
charities, but they tend to avoid this route because of the water’s edge 
policy, which raises such giving’s relative cost.168  Since World War II, 
private foundations have proven especially powerfully intermediaries for 
international altruism.169  One study from the early 1990s found that over 
10% of the largest U.S. foundations’ annual giving, amounting to more 
than $500 million, went either to foreign recipients or to domestic 
recipients for international purposes.170  A decade later, these figures have 
increased dramatically: the Foundation Center estimates that in 2005 U.S. 
foundations, led by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, gave nearly 20% 
                                                                                                                          
167 See Dale, supra note 39, at 658 (indicating that as of the early 1990s “[t]here [were] only 
approximately 1,000 foreign organizations listed as charitable in the I.R.S. Master File of Nonprofit 
Entities”). 
168 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 696; Roodman & Standley, supra note 3, at 5.  
See generally supra Part II.B. 
169 See Hall, supra note 24, at 17–18; Paul N. Ylvisaker, Foundations and Nonprofit 
Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 18, at 360, 371–74. 
170 FOUNDATION CENTER, THE FOUNDATION GRANTS INDEX 1994, at ix tbl.5 (1993).  
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of their grant dollars, or $3.8 billion, for international purposes.171  Public 
charities took a cosmopolitan turn somewhat later than foundations, 
starting around 1970.  Of the 2078 public charities classified by the IRS in 
1998 as “international and foreign affairs” entities (a subsector comprising 
organizations that focus on international disaster relief, economic 
development, cultural exchanges, research, and advocacy), 88% were 
founded in 1970 or later and 62% were founded in 1985 or later.172  
The American Association of Fundraising Counsel (AAFRC) 
introduced its own “international affairs” category for philanthropy 
recipients in 1987.  From that year to 1993 the annual amount of private 
contributions flowing to these recipients nearly tripled, from $780 million 
to $2.2 billion, and from 1993 to 2003 the amount nearly tripled again, to 
$5.3 billion,173 making international affairs easily the fastest-growing 
recipient category over the past two decades.174  These figures, striking in 
their own right, understate the true growth in internationally-targeted 
contributions, as many of the nonprofits not classified under international 
affairs likely increased their own foreign expenditures.175  International 
affairs charities garnered only 2.2% of private giving in 2003.176  If the 
nine other types of AAFRC charities (religion; education; health; human 
services; arts, culture, and humanities; public-society benefit; 
environment/animals; foundations; and unclassified) had spent just 1% of 
their 2003 contributions outside of the United States, it would have 
represented an additional $2 billion in internationally-targeted giving.177  
One percent is a conservative estimate, given how many of these 
                                                                                                                          
171 LOREN RENZ & JOSIE ATIENZA, FOUND. CTR., INTERNATIONAL GRANTMAKING UPDATE: A 
SNAPSHOT OF U.S. FOUNDATION TRENDS 1–2, 6 (2006), available at http://foundationcenter.org/ 
gainknowledge/research/pdf/intl_update_2006.pdf.  The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, established 
in 2000 and, with an endowment topping $30 billion, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Foundation 
Fact Sheet, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/MediaCenter/FactSheet/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2006), now 
easily the largest foundation in the world, has taken an aggressively internationalist tack from the 
beginning.  The foundation’s flagship program concerns global health, and its mission is “to help make 
sure that all people, no matter where they’re born, have the chance to make the most of their lives.”  
BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2004), available at http://www.gates 
foundation.org/AboutUs/Annual-FinancialReports/.  Remarkably, the Gates Foundation now stands to 
double in size on account of Warren Buffett’s recent $31 billion pledge, a “historic gift” that the 
Foundation Center cites as the main reason why “international [foundation] giving can be expected to 
grow at a healthy pace” over the next decade.  RENZ & ATIENZA, supra, at 7. 
172 MURRAY S. WEITZMAN ET AL., THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC AND DESK REFERENCE 133 
tbl.5.4 (2002). 
173 AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 2004, at 44 (2004).  In 2003 inflation-
adjusted dollars, the amounts were $1.3 billion in 1987 and $2.8 billion in 1993.  Id.  
174 AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, supra note 109, at 25. 
175 See generally Salamon, supra note 5 (describing U.S. nonprofits’ increasingly international 
activities in recent years).  
176 AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, supra note 173, at 10. 
177 Calculated from id. 
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organizations operate foreign programs or support foreign causes; the 
famously internationalist Red Cross, for example, grossed over $2 billion 
in 1998 and is classified by the IRS under human services.178  Raise the 
estimate to 2%, and the total amount of private internationally-targeted 
giving in 2003 would have topped $10 billion—and comfortably exceeded 
USAID’s total budget of $8.2 billion for the following fiscal year.179  This 
figure is in line with data collected by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, which estimates that U.S. nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) gave $6.3 billion in 2003 to developing countries 
and $4.3 billion to middle-income countries, far more than any other 
country’s NGOs on a total basis and one of the highest rates on a per-capita 
and per-GDP basis.180  On the whole, then, Americans appear to give 
around 2% to 4% of their contributions to foreign recipients (and 2% of 
their income to charity), and 60% of foreign contributions to developing 
countries.181 
Compared to the average domestic charity, the organizations that 
ultimately receive most of Americans’ internationally-targeted donations—
U.S-based international affairs charities and foreign charities supported by 
U.S.-based intermediaries—share some notable structural differentials.  
With 62% of its 1998 revenue coming from private contributions and 20% 
from government grants, the international affairs subsector relies far more 
heavily on private contributions and somewhat more heavily on 
government grants than do the other U.S. nonprofit subsectors, and far less 
heavily on fees for services or payments for goods.182  One reason for this 
                                                                                                                          
178 WEITZMAN ET AL., supra note 172, at 178. 
179 TARNOFF & NOWELS, supra note 11, at 10 tbl.1.  The U.S. government’s total spending on 
official development assistance, defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) as the sum of grants, technical support, and sub-market-rate loans made to 
developing countries “with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the main 
objective,” OECD, DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2005, at 260 (2006), was $16.3 billion in 
2003.  Id. at 172 tbl.8.   
180 See Roodman & Standley, supra note 3, at 6 tbl.1, 7 tbl.2 (reporting statistics from the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee database).  Of the twenty-two countries surveyed, only Ireland and 
Norway had higher per-capita and per-GDP foreign giving rates than the United States.  Id. at 7 tbl.2.  
Private U.S. support for middle-income countries, the authors indicate, goes mainly to Israel.  Id. at 5, 
21.  Another recent study frequently referenced by government officials, CAROL C. ADELMAN ET AL., 
HUDSON INST., AMERICA’S TOTAL ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD: 
RETHINKING THE USES AND NATURE OF FOREIGN AID (2005), available at 
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Rethinking_Foreign_Aid.pdf, provides much higher estimates 
of private annual U.S. foreign giving (approximately $19 billion, not counting remittance payments or 
volunteer time, id. at 2–3), but the Center for Global Development report suggests this may be the 
result of double counting.  Roodman & Standley, supra note 3, at 9–10.   
181 See Roodman & Standley, supra note 3, at 5–6, 9–10.  The 4% estimate, which I think more 
realistic, includes contributions to both international affairs charities and to other U.S.-based nonprofits 
that relay the funds abroad.  
182 WEITZMAN ET AL., supra note 172, at 170; see also LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 101 (1992) (discussing U.S.-based international relief and development 
assistance organizations’ reliance on private giving); Salamon & Flaherty, supra note 39, at 27–28 
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donation dependence is that international affairs charities, whose mission is 
to serve people in other countries, will often lack a natural base of client-
beneficiaries in the United States.  The foreign charities supported 
(indirectly) by Americans’ internationally-targeted giving are also likely to 
rely more on private donations than do most domestic charities—which 
rarely, if ever, receive donations from foreign sources—because U.S.-
based intermediaries presumably select recipients in part on the basis of 
need.  Both international affairs and foreign charities, accordingly, tend to 
be donative entrepreneurials183 with little potential to earn income.  Foreign 
charities may be especially capital-constrained within their national 
markets, which helps explain why the majority of funding for developing-
world nonprofits comes from developed-world countries.184  
Although some foreign charities are known to operate on a shoestring 
budget, the U.S.-based charities that provide services or send funds abroad 
in significant quantity may be expected to have higher overheads than 
comparable charities that do not have to incur cross-border transaction 
costs.  The cross-border premium on transaction costs likewise explains 
why it is generally more difficult for American donors to monitor 
international charitable activity: the activity is farther away, physically if 
not culturally, and neither the IRS nor most independent nonprofit 
watchdog groups offer evaluations for specific foreign programs or foreign 
charities.185  Donors face especially acute information deficits regarding 
their contributions, which lowers the scope for oversight and raises the 
premium on donee trustworthiness.  International charitable activity, as a 
result, may be particularly susceptible to what Henry Hansmann has 
termed “contract failure,” whereby consumers (in this case, donors) cannot 
enforce future performance because of difficulties in measuring the 
quantity or quality of the goods and services they paid for.186  Although 
                                                                                                                          
(identifying “international” as the only nonprofit category worldwide for which private philanthropy is 
the dominant source of income). 
183 This terminology comes from Henry Hansmann, who famously categorized nonprofit 
organizations along two main axes: donative (receive most of their income in the form of grants or 
donations) versus commercial (receive most of their income from fees charged for services); and 
mutual (controlled by patrons) versus entrepreneurial (free of patrons’ formal control).  Hansmann, 
Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 24, at 840–43.  Hansmann and others have since argued that subsidy 
theories will tend to work best for donative entrepreneurials.  See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE 
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 234–35 (1996); Hall & Colombo, Charitable Status, supra note 137, at 
389–404; Hall & Colombo, Donative Theory, supra note 137. 
184 Shaoguang Wang, Money and Autonomy: Patterns of Civil Society Finance and Their 
Implications, STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV., Winter 2006, at 3, 15–19. 
185 See generally Center for Nonprofit Excellence, Watchdog Groups, http://www.cfnpe.org/ 
site.cfm/watchdog.cfm (last visited Aug. 23, 2006) (summarizing and providing links to major 
watchdog organizations).  Watchdog groups do often rate the performance of international NGOs, as 
distinct from foreign charities. 
186 See Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 24, at 843–45. 
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Hansmann has not explored the transnational implications of his theory, it 
is telling that his paradigmatic example of a donative-entrepreneurial 
nonprofit arising to solve a contract failure problem is CARE, an 
international humanitarian organization.187 
Perhaps more apparent to donors than the structural characteristics of 
organizations receiving international support are the substantive practice 
areas in which these organizations tend to cluster.  While aggregate data do 
not exist on the foreign charities that receive funding from U.S.-based 
intermediaries, we do know that a high portion of international 
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) work on issues concerning the 
environment, humanitarian aid and human rights, or economic 
development.188  These are issues that involve deep transnational 
externalities and moral resonances, and so are logical candidates for INGO 
intervention.  Among U.S-based nonprofits that conduct their own 
programs in foreign countries, an important component is churches that 
send members abroad for missionary and service work.  One study found 
that approximately one-quarter of Americans’ giving to foreign and 
international affairs activities in 1995 went through religious 
organizations.189  With the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 
bolstering State Department protections for missionaries abroad,190 a 
number of American churches have expanded their international programs 
in the years since.191  The Mormon Church alone has roughly 60,000 
missionaries currently working in foreign countries.192  Thus while 
Americans’ contributions to religious organizations have declined as a 
percentage of total giving in the past decade—35.5% of all private giving, 
measured in dollars, went to religious organizations in 2004,193 down from 
                                                                                                                          
187 Id. at 842, 846–48, 880–81. 
188 See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 14–15, 66–77 (1993); HELD ET AL., 
supra note 8, at 67, 386–89; Martin A. Ölz, Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human 
Rights Systems, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 307, 309 n.1, 322 n.54 (1997) (providing further 
citations).  The Foundation Center indicates that in 2004 U.S. foundations gave more internationally-
targeted grant dollars to health, international development, and environmental causes, in that order, 
than to any other fields.  RENZ & ATIENZA, supra note 171, at 5. 
189 WEITZMAN ET AL., supra note 172, at 72 tbl.3.11 (reporting statistics from prior studies). 
190 Pub. L. No. 105–292, 112 Stat. 2787 (1998) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6445 (2000)).  
Some charged that the IRFA was passed specifically to promote the work of missionary religions.  See 
T. Jeremy Gunn, A Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the International Religious Freedom Act of 
1998, 2000 BYU L. REV. 841, 851–56 (explaining and disputing these charges).  
191 See Ian Shapira, Churches Expand Horizons with Service Abroad: Missionary Work Not Just 
for Professionals, WASH. POST, June 5, 2005, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File; 
Daniel Dedeyan, Inst. for Global Engagement, Faith-Based Initiatives Abroad: More than Politics (Oct. 
22, 2004), http://www.globalengage.org/issues/2004/10/initiatives.htm.  
192 Patricia Wen, Faith in Their Work Risks Not Deterring U.S. Christians Who Labor Overseas, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2003, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File. 
193 AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, supra note 109, at 20. 
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47.0% in 1997194—churches and their missionaries remain a powerful 
vehicle, practically and symbolically, for international nonprofit activity. 
Along with the organizations that receive internationally-targeted 
contributions, the individuals who give them may also differ systematically 
from market norms.  The most striking distinction concerns wealth and 
social status.  Whereas the vast majority of Americans give to domestic 
charities and many give to religious organizations with foreign programs, 
the subset of donors that gives to secular, internationally-oriented 
recipients is much narrower.  In 1995, 6.1% of households made 
contributions to international and foreign affairs organizations, the lowest 
participation rate for any charitable activity area.195  Given that wealthier, 
better educated individuals have consistently polled as being much more 
committed to internationalism than the rest of America,196 a reasonable 
inference to draw from this donor concentration is that elite groups are 
especially overrepresented in the funding of these organizations.  If true, 
this would make internationally-targeted donations even more 
redistributive globally, and their deductibility even more upside-down 
domestically.197 
An interesting question is whether these donations are more altruistic 
on average than their domestically-targeted counterparts.  Because the 
benefits and beneficiaries of internationally-targeted gifts are located 
further from the donor’s home community, these donors may be in a 
weaker position to garner reputational, social, or financial advantages—not 
to mention impermissible quid pro quos—from their largesse.  If one 
defines a charitable contribution’s altruistic-ness as an inverse function of 
its capacity to yield extra-psychic personal gain, internationally-targeted 
contributions should, on balance, measure as more altruistic than 
domestically-targeted contributions.  At least, they should when made by 
individuals: corporations also make substantial outlays to international 
charity,198 but their motivations never stray far from the bottom line.  As 
the Conference Board reports, the growing emphasis in the corporate 
                                                                                                                          
194 AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 1998, at 23 (1998). 
195 WEITZMAN ET AL., supra note 172, at 71 fig.3.9, 72 tbl.3.11.  These are organizations 
specifically focused on (secular) international issues; many more domestic nonprofits, and hence their 
donors, support international causes at some level.  See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text. 
196 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 11, at 216.  
197 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining “upside-down” equity arguments 
against the deduction).  
198 See ANNE KLEPPER, CONFERENCE BD., GLOBAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF U.S. CORPORATIONS 7 
(1993) (“Over the past [ten] years, companies in the United States have increased their contributions to 
foreign countries by more than 500 percent.”); SOPHIA A. MUIRHEAD, CONFERENCE BD., THE 2004 
CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE GIVING PATTERNS OF 232 MAJOR 
CORPORATIONS IN 2003, at 4 (2003) (indicating that among one hundred survey respondents reporting 
international charitable contributions, foreign giving in 2003 totaled $1.1 billion). 
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sphere on “strategic philanthropy,” often led by marketing or public 
relations divisions, “has led corporations to align their contributions 
programs more closely with their business missions.”199  
What any of this means for donor tax-price elasticities is not clear.  
Although corporations are likely to be highly attuned and responsive to tax 
incentives, the strategic value of international philanthropy may in many 
cases provide sufficient inducement to give.  For individual donors, 
although no studies have tried to estimate elasticities specifically for 
internationally-targeted giving, many studies have shown that wealthy 
taxpayers tend to be more price-sensitive and that gifts to religious 
organizations are uniquely inelastic.200  These findings could be read to 
imply that secular internationally-targeted giving will be quite tax-price 
elastic—and to support the Center for Global Development’s estimate that 
over half of Americans’ foreign giving is attributable to the charitable 
deduction.201  On the other hand, if these gifts derive more strongly from 
altruistic motivations, even wealthy donors may not be as responsive to tax 
rate changes.202  Also potentially cutting against elasticity is the fact that 
donors to international causes have inferior volunteering alternatives.  If 
one wants to support the local welfare agency, church, or arts organization, 
it is often possible to volunteer instead of or in addition to donating.  For 
international causes, however, the cost of volunteering is greater, both in 
terms of time and resources, and cultural and language barriers may limit a 
volunteer’s effectiveness.  For the cosmopolitan-minded samaritan, writing 
a check may be the only realistic option. 
B. Applying—and Rethinking—the Theories 
1. Andrews 
Internationally-targeted charitable contributions pose little problem for 
William Andrews’s theory of the deduction—so little problem, in fact, that 
they illuminate just how limited the theory is.  For Andrews and his 
followers, recall, the charitable deduction is not needed to subsidize 
anything, nor would a subsidy rationale make any sense; the deduction is 
                                                                                                                          
199 MUIRHEAD, supra note 198, at 11. 
200 See sources cited supra note 121. 
201 Roodman & Standley, supra note 3, at 22 tbl.9. 
202 Another open question is whether internationally-targeted giving is subject to the phenomenon 
of “privileged groups,” groups that contain one or more members who get enough satisfaction from a 
good—in this case, foreign giving—to induce them to provide it for the entire membership.  See 
Gergen, supra note 86, at 1411 (explaining the economic theory).  Bill Gates may be serving this 
function right now for certain Americans concerned about global health issues.  See supra note 171.  
Yet at the same time, his foundation’s work may have increased aggregate demand for health-related 
foreign giving, such that it has become relatively more underprovided.  Although privileged groups 
will generally be less in need of subsidy, these dynamic demand effects and the general idiosyncracy of 
the phenomenon make it an unreliable guide for policymaking. 
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needed to instantiate an accurate and internally consistent definition of 
taxable income.203  Charitable contributions are not acts of personal 
consumption, and are therefore not countable as income, because they do 
not involve the preclusive appropriation of real economic resources.  They 
involve, instead, the creation of “common goods,” goods “whose 
enjoyment is not confined to contributors nor apportioned among 
contributors according to the amounts of their contributions.”204 
Internationally-targeted contributions fit easily into this framework.  If 
anything, these contributions are less likely than their domestically-
targeted analogues to involve private preclusive appropriation, because 
their donors have diminished capacity for personal gain.205  At the same 
time, internationally-targeted contributions are more likely to divert 
resources to common goods on account of the geographic disconnect 
between the donors and the persons meant to be benefited.  Andrews 
refused to draw distinctions regarding which types of charitable 
contributions have better or worse claims to the deduction.  If he had done 
so, internationally-targeted contributions might well have been his 
archetype.206 
This result is, of course, at odds with the water’s edge policy, which 
privileges domestic altruism over international altruism, rather than the 
other way around.  Internationalizing the scope of analysis thus scores 
another point against the tax-base-defining rationale as a descriptive theory 
of the deduction.  As a normative theory, however, the tax-base-defining 
rationale is neither helped nor hindered by the revelation that 
internationally-targeted contributions represent its strongest case for 
deductibility, because, as the thinness of the preclusive-
appropriation/common-good inquiry makes plain, the rationale has no 
                                                                                                                          
203 See supra Part III.A (summarizing Andrews’s tax-base-defining theory of the deduction). 
204 Andrews, supra note 73, at 346. 
205 See supra Part IV.A (penultimate paragraph). 
206 Mark Kelman, in his blistering critique of Andrews, implicitly corroborates this point.  Kelman 
notes that “Andrews never explicitly deals with three conditions that characterize the strongest case for 
deductibility” under his theory.  Kelman, supra note 71, at 835 n.14.  “First, the donor must be 
anonymous with respect to the donees, charitable organizations, and his community in general” so that 
he cannot “‘purchase’ deference or respect with his donation.”  Id.  “Second, the donor must not restrict 
the donee’s use of funds . . . .”  Id.  “Third, the donor must not receive direct services from the donee.”  
Id.  Each of these conditions is more likely to hold in the case of internationally-targeted donations, on 
account of the greater physical separation and information asymmetries between the donor and the 
donee. 
Andrews also makes an argument from economic neutrality, see supra note 77 and accompanying 
text, and here internationally-targeted contributions (of money) may have a weaker claim to the 
deduction because they are less easily replaced with contributions of time.  See supra Part IV.A 
(discussing, in the closing paragraph, the limits of transnational volunteerism).  But the economic 
neutrality argument is only an addendum to Andrews’s thesis, and a weak one at that, see supra note 86 
and accompanying text; the tax-base-defining rationale is, for Andrews and his followers, both 
necessary and sufficient to justify the deduction. 
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normative content to speak of.  Andrews’s failure to explain with any 
precision what is preclusive appropriation or a common good—and why 
the former requires full taxation, the latter full deduction—is not just a 
failure of definition; it is the failure to make any non-tautological argument 
at all.  
What is left is intuition, the feeling that charity ought to fall outside the 
taxman’s bailiwick.  Do Americans feel this sentiment more or less 
strongly about internationally-targeted charity?  Probably less strongly on 
the whole, considering that the water’s edge policy has failed to arouse 
popular opposition.  But there is a dangerous circularity here: the water’s 
edge policy is not only shaped by, but also helps shape taxpayer intuitions 
about the appropriate objects of charity.  And, more basically, arguments 
that intuition should not merely inform, but should dictate tax policy have 
not held much appeal since the Enlightenment.207  
2. Bittker 
Boris Bittker, like Andrews, never applied his theory outside of the 
domestic context; if he had done so, he too would have had to concede that 
internationally-targeted donations possess a superior claim to deductibility.  
For Bittker, the charitable deduction (1) equitably accounts for the loss of 
welfare suffered by donors, (2) respects how many donations derive from 
perceived moral obligations, and (3) rewards selfless acts.208  It is both fair 
and righteous, accordingly, to provide unlimited deductions for all 
legitimate gifts.  There are, however, gradations of welfare loss, moral 
obligation, and selflessness, and on each of these dimensions 
internationally-targeted contributions rank “higher” on average than their 
domestically-targeted kin. 
Compared to domestically-targeted contributions, internationally-
targeted contributions will tend to generate fewer reputational, social, or 
tangible benefits for their (individual) donors—these donors can expect to 
receive less extra-psychic compensation per dollar.209  Moreover, because 
internationally-targeted gifts do not directly benefit the people or 
organizations in a donor’s local community, social pressure will generally 
be lower to make them; in some cases, there may actually be negative 
social pressure directed at these gifts, as reflected in the mantra, “charity 
begins at home.”210  In place of social suasion, moral beliefs may play a 
                                                                                                                          
207 In the feudal and royal pre-Enlightenment history of tax policy debates, it was not uncommon 
for arguments from intuition and theology to be taken as decisive.  See Simon, supra note 18, at 75. 
208 See supra Part III.B (summarizing Bittker’s equitable theory of the deduction). 
209 Cf. supra Part IV.A (discussing, in the penultimate paragraph, internationally-targeted 
donations’ relative degree of altruistic-ness). 
210 I think it fair to classify “charity begins at home” as a mantra, with common currency and 
intonations of profundity, rather than dismiss it as a tired bit of epigrammatic Americana.  Typing in 
the exact phrase in Google on March 15, 2006 yielded 287,000 hits.  
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bigger role in compelling people to give their money to foreign causes.  
Taking together these two lines of argument, internationally-targeted 
donations come out looking more selfless—and therefore, for Bittker, more 
praiseworthy—because of their higher ratio of other-regarding to self-
regarding motive.  If one accepts Bittker’s three criteria for deduction-
worthiness, internationally-targeted donations seem especially deserving of 
a tax break, and, even more so than § 170’s percentage limitations, the 
water’s edge policy seems especially offensive to donor equity. 
Yet Bittker never develops his three equitable criteria; he just presents 
them, without any underlying normative framework or philosophy.  If 
“something can be said for rewarding activities which in a certain sense are 
selfless,”211 Bittker never says it.  Which brings us back to intuition.  
Bittker’s argument is structurally sounder than Andrews’s, in that it is 
transparent in its aims (to promote donor equity) and its evaluative 
methods (the three criteria).  Nevertheless, it too ultimately resolves into an 
appeal to the reader’s sense of what the Code is supposed to look like.  In 
this case, the intuition Bittker presses is that charitable giving is 
praiseworthy and ought to be rewarded as such by the tax system.  Whether 
most Americans believe internationally-targeted donations to be more or 
less praiseworthy is another empirical question beset by circularity and, to 
the rationalistic tax policymaker, beside the point.  
Applying Andrews’s and Bittker’s theories of the deduction to 
internationally-targeted donations thus reveals quite a lot about these 
theories’ limits, and usefully highlights how classic principles of tax logic 
and donor equity can be invoked to support international deductions.  
Andrews and Bittker are of less help, however, if one wants to devise a 
systematic tax approach to questions of foreign-versus-domestic charity.  
For that, the deduction must be conceptualized as a subsidy.  
3. Subsidy Theories 
The first and perhaps most cited of the major subsidy theories, treasury 
efficiency, combines two ideas: that the charitable deduction substitutes for 
direct government expenditures, and that donor tax-price elasticities have 
an absolute value greater than 1.0.212  The former idea, recall, was 
presented as the killer argument in favor of the deduction, and its water’s 
edge restriction, in the legislative history.213  Although such 
counterfactuals are inherently speculative, it seems fair to assume that if 
deductions for internationally-targeted donations were disallowed, the 
                                                                                                                          
211 Bittker, supra note 70, at 60. 
212 See supra Part III.C.1 (explaining treasury efficiency and related concepts). 
213 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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government would be less likely to compensate for the resultant decline in 
giving than it would be for a comparable decline in domestic giving.  This 
result may be expected, most obviously, because legislators tend to be 
more responsive to domestic concerns, but also because only a small 
fraction of Americans give to secular internationally-focused 
organizations214—thus limiting the political necessity of compensation—
and because the government is constitutionally barred from directly 
subsidizing missionary work abroad.  Tax-price elasticities for foreign 
donations, I suggested earlier, may be either higher or lower than for 
domestic donations; assuming these elasticities are, on average, roughly 
equal, a further result would be a marked decline in foreign giving per 
dollar of tax revenue for secular causes, though not much effect on giving 
for religious causes.  Domestic giving per tax dollar, by contrast, would 
rise if donors substitute American donees for foreign donees, which to 
some extent is almost sure to happen.215  There is also the issue of 
investment efficiency, or the ratio of nonprofit output to total spending.  
While transaction costs are generally higher for internationally-targeted 
donations—and artificially inflated by the need for U.S.-based 
intermediaries under the water’s edge policy—this discrepancy is declining 
due to the Internet, and foreign charities, being more cash-starved and 
donation-dependent, may still be able to generate greater output than 
domestic charities per dollar received.  
On the whole, then, the effect of eliminating deductions for 
internationally-targeted contributions would likely be to bolster the public 
fisc and domestic giving and, within the United States, to increase treasury 
efficiency and investment efficiency; but to reduce the amount of foreign 
giving and, on a global scale, to decrease treasury efficiency and possibly 
investment efficiency.  The effect of expanding deductions for 
internationally-targeted contributions—most simply, by allowing 
deductions for direct gifts to foreign charities—would likely be the reverse.  
Which of these scenarios is preferable?  Treasury efficiency theory (and 
the associated replacement-of-government-burdens and investment 
efficiency ideas) cannot tell us, in two senses: it supplies no argument as to 
why the deduction should be linked to the particular ratio of charitable 
giving to government spending, and it supplies no guidance as to the 
                                                                                                                          
214 See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text. 
215 Such substitution would be expected to happen if one assumes that donors allocate foreign 
giving and domestic giving from a common budget or, at least, from overlapping budgets, and if one 
assumes that foreign giving is a normal good or, at least, not an inferior good.  Both assumptions are 
reasonable: indeed, the implicit logic (and moral argument) of the “charity begins at home” aphorism is 
that the more donors contribute to causes far away, the less they will contribute to causes near their 
home.  Of the major types of foreign charity, gifts for missionary efforts should be the least susceptible 
to tax inducements one way or the other, in light of the highly specialized purposes they serve and the 
uniquely low tax-price elasticities of religious contributions.  
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geographic boundaries within which to calculate this ratio.  Saving the 
government money and stimulating charitable contributions may be good 
things, but, as considerations of international altruism render especially 
vivid, they are just two of the many possible goals that a subsidy might 
serve.  
Utilitarian theories of the deduction are more helpful because their 
normative premises are more coherent and compelling, but applying these 
theories to internationally-targeted donations only redoubles their ethical 
and empirical difficulties.  Let us first assume a strict isolationist-
utilitarian concerned only with maximizing the aggregate social welfare 
(whether defined by reference to happiness, human flourishing, preference 
satisfaction, or wealth) of Americans.  At first blush, it might seem clear 
that allowing deductions for internationally-targeted donations would run 
counter to this goal.  The most direct threat such deductions pose for 
Americans’ welfare is the displacement of domestic charity with foreign 
charity: the substitution effect implicitly censured in reminders that 
“charity begins at home.”  Subsidizing foreign giving will lead to lower 
levels of nonprofit output—and hence to lower levels of public good 
provision—in American communities, and may also lead to a weakened 
nonprofit marketplace if a sizeable contingent of would-be donor-
overseers, often from elite societal groups, starts paying less attention to 
domestic charities. 
Radically disinterested parties,216 who experience a decrease in utility 
from being forced to subsidize certain causes, may be a particular problem 
for international deductions.  Some Americans will resent any loss of 
domestic charity in favor of foreign charity (the America-first concern); 
some will resent the strengthening of transnational actors they see as 
ineffectual, illegitimate, or otherwise misconceived (the INGO concern); 
some will resent the possible undermining of IRS oversight (the regulatory 
concern); some will resent the aggrandizement of elite power with respect 
to international affairs—and maybe even see in the subsidy an effective 
delegation of foreign policy to these elites (the democratic concern); and 
some will resent the encouragement of missionary agendas (the secularist, 
or religious neutrality concern).  Moreover, if international gifts command 
a higher media profile or are otherwise more salient, the deduction’s 
opacity may offer a less effective shield against the ire of third parties.  For 
every util gained by the satisfied international donor, allowing her to 
deduct her gift may reduce the subjective and objective welfare of 
numerous compatriots.  
                                                                                                                          
216 This is Mark Gergen’s label.  See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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However, if one takes a broader view of the deduction’s effects—
without yet relaxing the assumption that Americans’ welfare is all that 
matters—there is a plausible case to be made that net social welfare will be 
greater in a tax system with more generous international deductions.  A 
threshold consideration is that, despite the fears of the charity-begins-at-
home crowd, domestic giving will not meaningfully, or at least not 
proportionately, decline.  It is probably too much of a stretch to argue that 
domestic and foreign giving are complementary goods, but if the two types 
of giving reflect sufficiently distinct donative calculi, substitution between 
them may be substantially incomplete.217  Subjectively, although certain 
Americans may be especially displeased by the subsidization of foreign 
contributions, many others may be especially happy to free-ride off this 
brand of altruism.  Some international causes are among the least 
objectionable and most morally compelling that exist—famine and disaster 
relief, for example.  The low political support in the United States for 
(direct) governmental foreign aid does not necessarily transfer over to the 
realm of indirect tax subsidy.  Even if it does, Weisbrod’s median voter 
theory218 suggests that deductions may have an especially important role to 
play in augmenting foreign giving to meet inframarginal demand. 
Objectively, all Americans stand to benefit from foreign charity that 
helps abate interspatial negative externalities: the environmental pollutants, 
infectious diseases, and destructive ideologies that spread increasingly 
easily beyond borders.  These are paradigmatic social harms that the free 
market cannot be expected to rectify on its own, and that governments may 
be handicapped from addressing in full because of political and 
institutional constraints—most notably, the legislator pressure to 
overweight short-term threats relative to long-term threats, the 
complexities of multilateral cooperation, and the difficulties of sustaining 
coordinated responses over changing administrations.  By contrast, the 
benefits of domestic contributions often accrue to highly concentrated 
groups of clients and supporters; remember that the Code makes no effort 
to link deductibility to an organization’s ability to generate collective 
benefits or its need for subsidy.  Compared to contributions to the local 
church or arts organization, contributions to causes such as environmental 
                                                                                                                          
217 There is a regrettable hole in the empirical literature concerning this question, reflecting how 
not only nonprofit tax scholarship but economic research more generally has scanted the distinction 
between domestically- and internationally-targeted charitable giving.  I showed in Part IV.A that 
foreign donors and donees possess a number of distinctive characteristics as compared to their domestic 
counterparts, and argued that foreign contributions will on average reflect a higher proportion of other-
regarding motive.  Empirical research into the relative tax-price elasticities of, and the degree of 
substitution between, foreign and domestic giving could make a large contribution to deduction theory.  
Irrespective of what it does to the quantity of domestic giving, however, internationalizing the 
marketplace of donees may have the effect of increasing, not decreasing, the quality of domestic 
charities by forcing them to contend with stiffer competition for donor dollars. 
218 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.   
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protection and human rights, two mainstays of INGO activity,219 are much 
more diffuse in their benefits.  Indeed, contributions to a vast range of 
international causes, even when they do not involve clear cross-border 
externalities, have the potential to yield objective benefits for Americans 
by generating goodwill toward the United States and helping to create 
more prosperous and stable trading partners.220  There is a temporal 
tradeoff implicit in this analysis: the benefits from subsidizing foreign 
charity (cultivating goodwill, strengthening economic relationships, 
abating cross-border negative externalities) may not be immediately 
apparent, but their longer-term implications are profound. 
What about the radically disinterested parties?  There may be a greater 
number of them with respect to international deductions because of the 
concerns enumerated above, but this is not inevitable; domestic nonprofits, 
after all, have plenty of taxpayer enemies.221  And because domestic 
nonprofits and their activities are physically closer, their enemies may 
dislike them more intensely.  Yet even to go down this route of speculation 
is, for the utilitarian theorist of the deduction, to risk excessive subjectivity, 
and excessive deference to the views of a minority, in the cost-benefit 
calculus.222  Bringing internationally-targeted donations into the analysis 
thus shines a spotlight on the ethical and empirical limits of the utilitarian 
argument: allowing deductions for these gifts threatens to magnify the 
violation of the Pareto ideal at the same time that it offers the potential to 
increase long-term social welfare, and it is impossible to quantify either 
with anything close to precision.223 
                                                                                                                          
219 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
220 I return to the idea of goodwill in Part V.B.  Along with any abatement of interspatial 
externality threats, stimulation of goodwill and international trade are among the foreign charity 
benefits with the most clearly positive implications for the U.S. economy.  On account of these 
economic effects and the inefficiencies inherent in much domestic nonprofit activity, deductions for 
international gifts may hold especially strong appeal for those (few) utilitarians whose preferred 
yardstick is social wealth, not social welfare.  For explorations of social wealth maximization as a 
moral and policy guide, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48–115 (1981); Richard 
A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 85 (1985). 
221 See, e.g., GILBERT M. GAUL & NEILL A. BOROWSKI, FREE RIDE: THE TAX-EXEMPT ECONOMY 
(1993); ODENDAHL, supra note 111. 
222 Recall that if a utilitarian theorist supports the deduction, then by necessity she is already deep 
into Kaldor-Hicks terrain and must find net improvements in social welfare sufficiently compelling to 
override the disinterests of a minority.  See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
223 Much of the above (and below) discussion in this Subsection holds equally for corporate 
contributions.  With internationally-targeted gifts, corporations may be especially useful vehicles for 
economizing on information gathering and administration, and there may be less of a concern that 
CEOs will manipulate these gifts toward their own pet causes.  On the other hand, sending corporate 
contributions abroad may exacerbate agency and political power concerns.  
To be sure, though, more work needs to be done to internationalize our understanding of the 
corporate charitable deduction.  For a thorough review of the literature on corporate philanthropy and 
tax policy, see Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of 
the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 582 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:531 
 
So, even if one restricts the community of interest to the United States, 
a devout isolationist-utilitarian could still come down on either side of the 
debate over international deductions.  There is nothing necessary, however, 
about this geographic restriction.  To the contrary, many utilitarians—
including many tax scholars—would find such a restriction to be morally 
arbitrary, if not grotesque.224  If one takes a universalist-utilitarian 
perspective instead, there is a powerful argument that enhancing 
deductibility for foreign giving will enhance global welfare.  Greater 
heterogeneity of preferences for public goods will mean that nonprofits 
have a greater role to play in fulfilling residual demand.  Both INGOs and 
U.S.-based nonprofits that have international missions tend to be donative 
entrepreneurials with limited commercial potential, to address social 
problems involving interspatial negative externalities, and to generate 
diffuse collective benefits subject to freeriding: which is to say, they are 
the ideal donees under efficient subsidy theories.225  Foreign charities are a 
more eclectic lot, but it is plausible that, on average, they would get greater 
use from any additional donor dollars than the jilted domestic charities 
would have, both because of relative production costs and, more 
                                                                                                                          
224 For recent examples of tax scholarship advocating the maximization of world welfare as a 
policy goal, see Nina J. Crimm, Democratization, Global Grant-Making, and the Internal Revenue 
Code Lobbying Restrictions, 79 TUL. L. REV. 587, 666–67 (2005) (advocating global utilitarianism 
with respect to foundation grantmaking regulation); James R. Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A 
Deferential Reconsideration, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 385, 386 (1999) (presenting the common position that 
capital export neutrality is preferable to capital import neutrality as a tax principle because the former 
fosters greater world welfare).  
Perhaps the most famous living utilitarian philosopher, Professor Peter Singer, is also perhaps the 
most famous proponent of strong cosmopolitan duties—more specifically, of the view that “the average 
American family should donate a large portion of their income [any annual income over $30,000] to 
organizations like UNICEF and Oxfam.”  Peter Singer, Poverty, Facts, and Political Philosophies: A 
Debate with Andrew Kuper, in GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: WHO MUST DELIVER ON HUMAN RIGHTS? 
173, 173 (Andrew Kuper ed., 2005) (reprising earlier arguments from Peter Singer, The Singer Solution 
to World Poverty, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., Sept. 5, 1999, at 60, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
NYT File); see also Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229 (1972).  
Notice that gifts made directly to Singer’s exemplary recipients would not qualify for a deduction: an 
American donor would have to give through their domestic intermediaries, the U.S. Fund for UNICEF 
or Oxfam America. 
225 In this sense, these charities’ structural characteristics and substantive focus areas operate like 
a built-in rule-utilitarian check on foreign aid, assuming that levels of foreign-funded charitable activity 
are positively correlated with levels of host-country net welfare and that this relationship remains 
positive as the former increases.  There are raging debates over the role of INGOs in international law, 
politics, and society, debates beyond this Article’s scope; my general assumptions are that both INGOs 
and NGOs are more positive than negative for American and world welfare, and that the global 
associational revolution is a salutary development we should continue to encourage.  Especially 
considering that NGOs coordinate so much of the world’s humanitarian and development aid, see 
generally sources cited in Ölz, supra note 188, at 309 n.1, 322 n.54, I do not think this a naïve or even 
controversial assumption.  Some foreign charity coordinated from abroad may be imperialistic, some 
(like the proselytizing component of missionary work) dogmatic, and some counterproductive, but 
most charity continues to support “good” goods.  Moreover, much foreign charity is not coordinated 
from abroad, only financed.  And it is Kaldor-Hicks, not Pareto, efficiency that we are seeking. 
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contestably, because charitable provision may be subject to declining 
marginal utility of contributions received.226  
Another contestable yet commonsensical assumption is relevant here: 
the declining marginal utility of income (and its corollary, the declining 
marginal utility of non-cash assistance).  Interpersonal utility comparisons 
may be taboo in modern economic theory, but philosophers since Rawls 
have acknowledged that we inevitably make at least approximate 
interpersonal comparisons.227  Perhaps the most unobjectionable 
comparison is to assume that a starving or severely ill person would be 
made relatively better-off from an additional unit of money or aid than a 
healthier, wealthier person would be.  Indeed, if we did not hold this 
assumption, there would be little humanitarian charity.  Foreign charities in 
developing countries—where most internationally-targeted giving ends 
up228—are more likely than domestic charities to address material and 
social deprivation, and much more likely to address severe deprivation.  
The United States has no shortage of deprived populations, to be sure, but 
the reallocation of charitable flows under a more generous international 
deduction system would, on balance, channel aid to needier beneficiaries. 
This simple insight has important implications for a universalist-
Rawlsian229 theorist of the charitable deduction.  Enhancing deductions for 
internationally-targeted contributions, as discussed above, is likely to 
increase both the total and relative amount of foreign giving.  If Saul 
Levmore’s theory that taxpayer empowerment fosters more progressive-
minded and generous spending on public goods exports to the transnational 
context, enhancing these deductions could increase foreign giving further 
still.230  In light of global resource disparities, the rise in foreign charity 
would be massively redistributive and, in light of the strong humanitarian 
component to much international charity, might have especially powerful 
welfare effects for the world’s most disadvantaged.231  Not just a 
                                                                                                                          
226 This is contestable primarily because organizations need the capacity to put contributions to 
use, and foreign charities may on average have lesser ability to process new contributions and integrate 
them into their programs.  However, any such deficit may conversely imply that there is great marginal 
utility to be gleaned from donations that target capacity- and infrastructure-building, up to some 
threshold level. 
227 See Kelman, supra note 71, at 841 n.32.  Such comparisons are a standard theme in the 
charitable literature.  See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2005, at 53 (2005). 
228 See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.  
229 I am of course using the “Rawlsian” label very loosely in the main text, as a shorthand for a 
primary commitment to distributive justice.  Cf. supra notes 118, 140 and accompanying text 
(explaining my choice of terms). 
230 See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.  
231 This is not to say that all internationally-targeted contributions will serve needy groups.  It is 
worth noting, however, that even though international environmental protection—the other main INGO 
practice area along with human rights and economic development—does not generally focus on 
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universalist-Rawlsian theory, but almost any moderately cosmopolitan 
theory of social justice—for instance, Martha Nussbaum’s or Amartya 
Sen’s capabilities approach232—would applaud.  The water’s edge policy 
could not compare.  
Still, it is important to recognize just how far a deviation this would be 
from a rigorous application of the maximin principle.  Gauging the 
redistributiveness or the welfare effects of a deduction policy is hard 
enough within the United States.  Internationalizing the scope of inquiry 
compounds the empirical difficulties, and it dramatically complexifies 
questions of identification and remedy: how does the Rawlsian deduction 
theorist identify the “worst-off” individuals in the world, and how does she 
tailor the deduction to address their needs?  These goals are so elusive in 
the international context, their analytic constructs so fraught, that 
distributive justice starts to lose all coherence as a theory or policy guide 
for the deduction and is left offering little more than an aspirational ideal.  
Enhancing deductions for internationally-targeted contributions poses 
fewer conceptual problems for the isolationist-Rawlsian, but much sharper 
worries about the effects on distributive justice.233  For the isolationist-
Rawlsian, concerned only with the well-being of America’s worst-off, the 
substitution of foreign for domestic giving under an enhanced international 
deduction scheme would immediately raise flags.  Just because domestic 
giving might decline, however, does not mean that America’s worst-off 
individuals would be made worse off.  The wealthiest taxpayers, who 
would be the most responsive to changes in deductibility and would have 
the most money to donate, already allocate the majority of their domestic 
donations toward non-redistributionary causes.234  For moral reasons, 
wealthy and non-wealthy taxpayers may be less inclined to reduce giving 
to charities that serve the neediest Americans.  Religious giving, for 
instance, is especially price-inelastic.  For political as well as moral 
reasons, the federal and state governments may also intervene, providing a 
systemic check against at least some of the harms.  And America’s least 
fortunate groups also stand to benefit from the cross-border positive 
externalities generated by foreign contributions.  The isolationist-Rawlsian, 
                                                                                                                          
material or social deprivation, it may still be quite progressive in the distribution of its benefits if, as 
seems likely, poorer individuals tend to live under worse environmental conditions. 
232 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, 
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 70–95, 224–324 (2006); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
233 Rawls himself was by no means an isolationist, but he was very sensitive to the difficulties of 
extending social contract theory to the international level, so sensitive that he famously postponed this 
move until late in his career.  See generally JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999); JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
234 See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.  If, under a more generous international 
deductions scheme, the wealthy substituted most of their giving away from self-benefiting nonprofit 
pursuits, it is possible that America’s poor would be made better off in an intra-U.S. relative sense.  
This would no doubt be small comfort, however. 
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therefore, could conceivably be accommodated to increased deductibility 
for foreign contributions, at least in the long term.  That this is even 
remotely possible speaks volumes about the descriptive failures of 
“Rawlsian” deduction theory: if § 170 provides only the crudest of 
utilitarian constraints on deductibility, its link to the maximin principle, or 
to any redistributive principle, is cruder still.   
Finally, we come to communitarian arguments for the deduction.  Like 
the isolationist-utilitarian, the isolationist-communitarian would be quite 
troubled by any rise in “radical disinterest” following an enhanced 
international deduction, not so much as a matter of individual welfare but 
as a threat to social cohesion.  And like both the isolationist-utilitarian and 
the isolationist-Rawlsian, she would be troubled by the donative 
substitution effect.  Reduced levels of domestic giving may cause some 
local nonprofits to contract or fold, decreasing social pluralism and 
communal capacity for voluntary association.  Increased ratios of foreign 
to domestic giving may also pose indirect threats, such as the attenuation 
of donors’ (including corporate donors’) attachments to their home 
communities and to the donee organizations.  Charity would be propelled 
further away from the thick, social-capital-rich sphere of community 
relationships and closer toward the bloodless sphere of Internet 
fundraising, mass mailings, and low-sweat relief of one’s duties to others.  
“What we require,” Professor Benjamin Barber inveighs, “are healthy, 
democratic forms of local community and civic patriotism rather than 
abstract universalism and the thin gruel of contract relations.”235  It is not 
just the balance between polis and cosmopolis that is upset by drawing a 
tax equivalence between domestic and foreign gifts; it is the undermining 
of social and civic engagement, the degradation and anonymization of 
charity. 
This tension between a cosmopolitan deduction and the communitarian 
program may be something of a caricature, however.236  Entirely separate 
from the domestic-versus-international issue, I noted above, the deduction 
could be seen to jeopardize communitarian values—fueling extremist and 
self-interested groups, dividing social classes, cheapening the act of giving, 
decreasing volunteerism.237  This corrosive capability would exist even if 
Americans gave exclusively to domestic organizations.  Moreover, there is 
                                                                                                                          
235 Benjamin R. Barber, Constitutional Faith, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS 
OF PATRIOTISM 30, 31 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996). 
236 The analysis here thus offers a slightly new wrinkle on the relationship between 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, which are often taken as antagonists in modern political 
theory.  For a particularly engaging discussion of recent debates between cosmopolitans and 
communitarians, see Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 (1992). 
237 See supra Part III.C.4 (penultimate paragraph). 
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no one-to-one tradeoff between communal virtue and cosmopolitan virtue: 
foreign giving might deflect money away from local organizations yet 
nevertheless support values like altruism, solidarity, and responsibility 
within the local context through virtue spillovers, especially considering 
how much foreign giving is humanitarian in nature.  While there may be no 
such thing as a universalist-communitarian—who not only supports 
communitarian goals the world over but also takes the world as a single 
organic community—plenty of communitarians support a vision of global 
pluralism and global ethics.238  
Domestic organizational pluralism would be the clearest loser from 
expanding international deductibility, owing to the substitution effect.  But 
pluralism is not, or at least should not be, a categorical good for 
communitarians and others who tout it in defense of the charitable 
deduction.  Communitarians want social power to be “dispersed and 
balanced—but not fragmented”; they seek a “congenial” social 
pluralism.239  Because those self-serving donors and divisive nonprofits 
that undermine communitarian values have much greater potential to do 
(domestic) harm when their focus is domestic, it is possible that increased 
foreign giving would support congenial pluralism even as it reduced 
overall pluralism in the U.S. nonprofit sector.  On yet another level, then, 
pluralism emerges as an ambiguous value for the deduction critic, and 
certainly not the dispositive argument in its favor that some have taken it to 
be.240  Applying communitarian theory to foreign giving reveals how there 
may be “sociological” pitfalls to elevating such giving’s status through the 
tax code, in addition to the more evident economic and possibly 
distributional concerns.  But as with utilitiarianism and distributive justice, 
the analysis does not yield clear answers and, if anything, suggests that 
subsidizing internationally-targeted donations may ultimately prove just as 
appealing as subsidizing domestically-targeted donations. 
There is an even more fundamental ambiguity for the communitarian 
analysis of international deductions.  The isolationist-communitarian, by 
definition, may not care for communities outside the United States, but 
what about all the different communities within the United States?  Several 
U.S. states have attempted to ban charitable deductions for gifts to out-of-
state donees, only to have courts strike down these laws under the dormant 
                                                                                                                          
238 To take one example, the Responsive Community Platform, signed onto by numerous 
prominent communitarian scholars, contains a section on “The Human Community” which concludes: 
“Our communitarian concern may begin with ourselves and our families, but it rises inexorably to the 
long-imagined community of humankind.”  The Responsive Community Platform: Rights and 
Responsibilities, in THE COMMUNITARIAN READER, supra note 161, at 13, 23. 
239 Philip Selznick, Social Justice: A Communitarian Perspective, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Fall 
1996, at 13, 20. 
240 See supra notes 156, 165–66 and accompanying text. 
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Commerce Clause.241  That these laws were passed in the first place reveals 
the discontent some feel over the geographic promiscuity with which the 
deduction allocates its subsidy; not just the federal charitable deduction, 
but all its state siblings draw no spatial boundaries within the United 
States.  To support the deduction on account of its sociological benefits, 
therefore, one must already move beyond a localized conception of 
community, responsibility, or civic virtue.  These values, to the extent they 
are supported at all by the charitable deduction, must remain fuzzy and 
unrooted—which both undermines the force of the communitarian (or any 
sociological/secondary-benefit) argument for the deduction, and renders 
more arbitrary the drawing of a line at the national border. 
V.  TAX POLICY AT THE WATER’S EDGE 
Having critiqued the theories of the charitable deduction and applied 
them to internationally-targeted contributions, I seek in this Part to 
synthesize the foregoing discussion and draw out some implications.  In 
Section A, I propose an integrated theory of the deduction that would 
accommodate the strengths and weaknesses of each of its major 
justifications.  Applying the integrated theory to internationally-targeted 
contributions underscores just how strong their claim to deductibility is, 
and suggests that they deserve equal tax treatment to domestically-targeted 
contributions absent intervening complications.  There are intervening 
complications, however, as Section B explains.  Yet, while oversight and 
foreign policy concerns require some degree of deviation from geographic 
neutrality, the water’s edge policy is not well tailored to address either 
concern. 
This Part is necessarily succinct in its discussion of the integrated 
theory and the practical complications raised by foreign giving.  Each topic 
is worthy of sustained independent analysis.242  The goal here is to help 
stimulate and frame such analyses, and thereby move our understanding of 
                                                                                                                          
241 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (prohibiting 
states from denying nonprofits a property tax exemption on the grounds that many of their clients are 
nonresidents); Chapman v. Comm’r of Revenue, 651 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. 2002) (applying Camps 
Newfound to invalidate a state law conditioning deductibility on the donee’s in-state status).  A similar, 
though less dramatic protectionism can be seen in state statutes that prevent charities from soliciting 
funds unless they have registered in that state.  As of 1999, thirty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia had such laws.  ERIC MERCER, HOW MANY SOLICITING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS HAVE 
REGISTERED NATIONWIDE? (1999), http://www.paperglyphs.com/nporegulation/documents/soliciting 
_npos.html.  
242 I offer some additional thoughts on how and why we might want to conceptualize certain tax 
expenditures, including but not limited to the charitable deduction, as forms of foreign aid in David E. 
Pozen, Comment, Tax Expenditures as Foreign Aid, 116 YALE L.J. 869 (forthcoming 2007) (on file 
with Connecticut Law Review).  
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the charitable deduction in productive directions, not to provide definitive 
answers. 
A. Toward an Integrated Theory (and Application) of the Charitable 
Deduction 
Part III’s critical roadmap of the literature demonstrated that existing 
theories of the charitable deduction are flawed, along three main 
dimensions: none provides a compelling account of the deduction in 
anything like its present form;243 none is explicit, much less thoroughgoing, 
about its normative premises; and none takes into account the 
international/domestic distinction in contributions.  When that distinction 
is taken into account, Part IV showed, the theories’ warts emerge with all 
the more resplendence.  In particular, it becomes apparent how much 
Andrews’s and Bittker’s theories ultimately depend on intuition, and how 
much the subsidy theories are vulnerable not only to empirical uncertainty, 
counterevidence, and normative disagreement, but also to the choice of a 
relevant community within which to gauge the subsidy’s effects.  In this 
sense, internationalizing the scope of inquiry is not just some fanciful 
thought experiment; it is crucial for understanding how helpful (or, as the 
case may be, how unhelpful) the theories are for explaining and defending 
the deduction.  If these theories proved descriptively and prescriptively 
unsatisfying within the traditional analytic framework, they become all the 
more so when Americans’ internationally-targeted contributions—
contributions running over $10 billion per year and rising244—are admitted 
into the debate. 
And yet, none of the theories is completely sunk.  Andrews’s base-
defining-rationale comes out looking worst, but like Bittker’s argument for 
rewarding donors, it holds appeal at the level of intuition.  Most 
Americans, whether through historic conditioning or Tocquevillian 
conceptions of U.S. civil society or an innate sense of charity’s place in the 
Code, believe in the charitable deduction.245  Deontological notions of tax 
logic and donor equity help legitimize this belief.  This is important to 
remember because it points up an implicit flaw in the logic of many 
subsidy arguments: a subsidy is not only justifiable if it creates economic, 
communal, or even “sociological” benefits sufficiently weighty to 
counteract its costs; it may also be justifiable for the simple reason that 
taxpayers want it.  Preference satisfaction is a psychic benefit in its own 
                                                                                                                          
243 As a purely normative or prescriptive matter, this is not a flaw; the deduction might be deemed 
unjustifiable in its present form.  Yet given that the deduction seems politically safe from radical 
reform for the foreseeable future, I take these descriptive failings (these failures of “fit”) to be 
significant drawbacks. 
244 See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
245 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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right.  Relative to Andrews’s and Bittker’s accounts, the subsidy theories 
have more obvious and stronger claims to relevance: few people would 
reject altogether treasury efficiency, economic efficiency, social welfare 
maximization, distributive justice, associational pluralism, or robust 
community life as aspirations for a public policy.  And while the charitable 
deduction does not, at all times and in all ways, support each of these 
values—an impossible order, because these values will conflict—at some 
times and in some ways it supports them all.  Internationalizing the 
analysis problematizes but does not fundamentally displace any of these 
theories.  To the contrary, internationalizing the analysis shows how each 
can contribute to our understanding of the deduction’s costs and benefits. 
To make sense of the charitable deduction, then, I propose an 
integrated theory.  By integrated, I mean a theory that incorporates all of 
the major justificatory rationales explicated above, shears them of any 
claim to exclusivity, and applies the insights of each to explain the 
deduction and evaluate its effects.  This is by no means a unitary, or 
monistic, theory that offers a specific winning argument for the deduction 
or a specific normative frame within which to assess its desirability.  
Against the idealizing impulse, it is an admission that there can never be 
such a theory.246  The charitable deduction is too compromised a policy.  
Promulgated in the early 20th century out of simplistic replacement-of-
government-burdens ideas and vague intuitions about charity,247 it was 
undertheorized from the start.  As the nonprofit sector has grown 
(explosively, since the 1970s) and diversified—so that § 170 now includes 
many donations and donees barely recognizable as charity—theoretical 
coherence has further unraveled.   
                                                                                                                          
246 While it may be the case that no tax policy will submit to a single neat justification, the 
charitable deduction is notable for the number and diversity of theoretical perspectives claimed on its 
behalf.  Some scholars have applied more than one of these perspectives—most notably, Mark Gergen 
in his exceptionally thoughtful defense of the deduction, Gergen, supra note 86—but most scholars 
have not done so, and none has considered the full range of perspectives outlined here. 
Cass Sunstein has pointed out that “any simple general theory of a large area of the law—free 
speech, contracts, property—is likely to be too crude to fit with the best understandings of the multiple 
values that are at stake in the area.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 1733, 1748 (1995).  “For this reason, monistic theories are usually inadequate,” id., and 
incompletely theorized agreements will often be necessary to mediate “[t]he problem of social 
pluralism,” id. at 1734.  Sunstein’s argument helps explain how so many commentators have been able 
to support the charitable deduction without coming to agreement on the high-level principles 
underlying their support.  Even though the charitable deduction is not a “large area of the law” on the 
order of free speech or contracts, its policies affect large areas of human endeavor, and, as Part III’s 
critical roadmap revealed, the problem of social pluralism very much pervades the debate.  By crediting 
and incorporating the multiple high-level values fostered by the deduction, the integrated theory tries to 
avoid both monistic and incompletely theorized interpretations. 
247 See supra notes 23, 54, 104 and accompanying text. 
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Fundamentally, the deduction reflects the understanding that certain 
nonprofit goods and services will tend to go underprovided in the free 
market, and that we do not want a centralized administrative bureaucracy 
to compensate entirely for this deficit.  Beyond these basic insights, 
consensus breaks down.  Some seek in the charitable deduction to reify a 
vision of what it means to give, some seek approbation for donors, some 
seek efficiency of various kinds, some seek distributive justice, some seek 
liberal or communitarian ideals.  Alternative policies (for instance, 
matching grants, credits, or direct government funding) might better serve 
certain of these aims, but the deduction’s political resilience and its 
peculiar immunity from macro-level scrutiny of the kind applied in this 
Article suggest that no other policy could better broker among the 
competing values inherent in charitable tax policy.248  The benefits of the 
deduction are highly diffuse, its costs relatively small.  
Any monistic theory of the deduction—such as one based on treasury 
efficiency or economic efficiency, the two dominant ideas in the recent 
literature—will not only fail to explain features of the deduction that are 
plainly at odds with that theory’s normative premise, but will also slight 
the other values the deduction works to accommodate.  Only an integrated 
approach can capture the productive tensions embodied within the 
charitable deduction, and only an integrated approach can enable truly 
transparent discourse.  An integrated, nonideal theory gives us the best 
chance, descriptively, to make sense of the heterogeneous values the 
charitable deduction has come to serve, and the best chance, prescriptively, 
to evaluate reform options in a meaningful way. 
It is a thin theory, however; the cost of integration is normative 
conviction and evaluative ease.  The integrated theory I am proposing is, 
indeed, not a value-based theory at all.  Rather than try to foreclose value 
disagreements, it creates a discursive space for their deliberation.  To 
translate the theory into specific policy solutions, two value judgments 
need to be layered in: a hierarchy of substantive commitments, and the 
specification of a relevant community.  Among the major theories of the 
deduction, I suggested above that the most important, because the most 
normatively coherent and compelling, are those rooted in Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency (which especially favors deductions for gifts to organizations 
providing collective benefits and public goods), redistribution (which 
especially favors deductions for gifts to organizations providing services to 
disadvantaged groups), and communitarianism (which especially favors 
deductions for gifts to organizations that generate social capital and 
                                                                                                                          
248 The charitable deduction itself, of course, could be tweaked any number of ways so as to serve 
particular values more or less intensively; few supporters of the deduction think it perfect in its current 
form.  While this is not the place to consider specific refinements, the integrated theory provides a 
uniquely robust tool for understanding and evaluating any refinement’s expected impacts.  
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invigorate civil society).  How one prioritizes among (and within) these 
values, along with intuition and treasury efficiency, will depend on one’s 
background goals for tax policy, charity, and society more generally.  
There is no “right” hierarchy.  The integrated theory is therefore amenable 
to numerous permutations reflecting divergent views of the good.  But it 
should no longer be possible for a deduction theorist to isolate one of the 
views to the neglect of the others.  
The choice of community is, for the subsidy theorist, also a value-
based choice without a “right” answer.  In the previous Part, I showed how 
adopting the isolationist stance (in which domestic effects are all that 
matters) versus the universalist stance (in which no geographic distinctions 
are drawn) influences the analysis for the utilitarian, distributive, and 
communitarian critic of the deduction.  Yet while the isolationist-versus-
universalist distinction offers a useful tool for illustrating how the choice 
of community may be relevant, it is a false dichotomy.  For any tax 
expenditure, most Americans will fall in between these two poles, caring 
primarily about the national impact of the subsidy but also to some extent 
about its international impact.  Charity occupies a special place in this 
geographic calculus because it bears so basically on the questions of what 
we owe other people and how to trade off more local obligations for more 
distant ones—on questions of cosmopolitan duty.  Although many would 
reject Diogenes the Cynic’s call to be a pure cosmopolitan, a “citizen of the 
world,”249 even the most devout advocates of patriotism and particularism 
generally acknowledge that personal responsibilities do not fall away at the 
neighborhood, city, state, or national border, that just being human binds 
us morally and functionally to the plight of all persons, at least to a 
baseline level.250  A slew of practical and “plausibility” constraints, 
however, limits the ability of individuals to effectuate cosmopolitan duties: 
everything from informational deficits, to travel expenses, to intuition and 
habit, to cultural disjunctures, to collective action problems makes it more 
                                                                                                                          
249 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra 
note 235, at 2, 6. 
250 There has been a great outpouring of scholarship on cosmopolitan ethics in recent years.  For 
accessible synopses of the debates, see the essays collected in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra note 235; 
GLOBAL ETHICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY (John Eade & Darren O’Byrne eds., 2005); and GLOBAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 224, as well as KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS 
IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006).  David Held provides a particularly succinct summary of 
cosmopolitan theory in David Held, Globalization, Corporate Practice, and Cosmopolitan Social 
Standards, in GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 224, at 186, 189–94. 
The extent to which humans owe moral duties to non-human animals is another lively debate—
also prominently featuring Martha Nussbaum, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 232, at ch. 6, and Peter 
Singer, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975)—that complexifies the task of defining a 
relevant community and degrees of relevance within that community for purposes of the charitable 
deduction.  I thank Henry Hansmann for suggesting this point. 
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costly and more difficult to do good by someone in a faraway country than 
to do good by one’s neighbor.251 
The significance of this insight for the charitable deduction is that it 
augments the moral claim of a transnational perspective.  For many 
Americans, giving to an internationally-active NGO is the only realistic 
way, and certainly the most cost-effective way, to realize their 
responsibilities to people the world over, without so compromising their 
fiscal and temporal budgets as to undermine their local responsibilities.  
Pushing the government to give more foreign aid may go toward the same 
end (and, if successful, might even be a more effective substitute), but it is 
a far less direct and intimate means; it is not charity.  To be a humane 
global actor, much less a citizen of the world, it will often be NGO 
contributions or nothing.  This is not a policy argument for displacing 
government aid with private aid, which at some point would yield 
undesirable consequences.252  It is, rather, a realistic argument that NGOs 
will often provide the most powerful vehicle for Americans to fulfill basic 
duties to foreigners while preserving agency and ownership, which links § 
170 indelibly to issues of global ethics.  Thus, while there is no “right” 
community for assessing the effects of the charitable deduction, I am 
suggesting that there is a wrong community—and it is the United States 
alone.253   
                                                                                                                          
251 These plausibility limitations have led to an “institutionalist turn” in cosmopolitan ethics, 
wherein duties “are best viewed as attaching to domestic institutions (e.g., national governments) and, 
derivatively, to international institutions” rather than to individuals.  Jack Goldsmith, Liberal 
Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2003).  As substate but often 
transnational actors influenced by but autonomous of donors, NGOs, like the state-subsidized 
charitable deductions that support them, occupy a middle space between individualist and 
institutionalist modes of fulfilling interpersonal duties. 
252 Apart from any political impacts, undesirable practical consequences might flow the fact that 
NGOs are not democratically elected or accountable, from their relative inability to produce large-scale 
growth or redistribution, or from the bureaucratization that inevitably follows revenue gains.  
Consequentialist arguments such as these against subsidizing foreign contributions can be evaluated 
under the utilitarian, distributive, or communitarian frameworks.  These arguments have some force 
and provide an important check on Peter Singer-like arguments that Americans should give all non-
essential income to Oxfam.  See supra note 224.  Nevertheless, most contributions to foreign charities 
will do far more good than harm for the donee country, cf. supra notes 225–26 and accompanying text, 
and for purposes of specifying a community of interest, such consequentialist considerations are not 
relevant.  
253 Within this framework, one could still reach very different conclusions on international 
deductibility depending on how strongly one prioritizes Americans’ welfare and in what ways.  The 
moral argument for subsidizing private contributions to the Vienna Opera, for example, may be far 
weaker than the argument for subsidizing contributions to famine relief.  And the practical benefits 
from subsidizing contributions to the Vienna Opera may be far smaller than the benefits from 
subsidizing contributions to an INGO devoted to eradicating global terrorism.  One might be tempted, 
therefore, to employ a national norm and allow deductions only for a certain class of internationally-
targeted gifts—say, those gifts that are sufficiently morally compelling or sufficiently likely to advance 
U.S. interests. 
Sensible though this may sound, I would reject such a move.  As a practical matter, it would be 
extremely difficult to separate out the deserving from the undeserving gifts.  Such line-drawing would 
politicize deduction policy, distort the marketplace of foreign charity, and require new forms of 
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If the integrated theory’s thinness may be taken as a general limitation, 
it proves a virtue for evaluating the deduction-worthiness of foreign gifts, 
for no matter how one prioritizes the component theories or defines the 
community of interest, most of these gifts end up appearing quite worthy.  
The base-defining and donor-equity rationales, recall, press strongly in 
favor of deductibility for internationally-targeted contributions—more 
strongly, indeed, than for domestically-targeted contributions because the 
former are less likely to involve private preclusive appropriation or to 
reflect self-interested motive.  But the more remarkable takeaway from 
Part IV is that even for the isolationist utilitarian, distributive, or 
communitarian theorist of the deduction, internationally-targeted 
contributions hold a respectable claim to deductibility when their 
implications are considered in full.  For each theorist’s universalist 
doppelgänger, this claim is all the more compelling.   
Although foreign giving exacts some domestic costs, it supports 
relatively efficient, donative organizations; it creates positive externalities 
that increase social welfare both psychically and tangibly, over a long time 
horizon; it is highly redistributive globally without likely ill effects for 
America’s worst-off individuals; and it has greater potential to increase 
social capital and civic virtue than to decrease them.  Among foreign gifts, 
the most morally compelling will tend to be those made to charities 
operating in developing countries, while the most instrumentally valuable 
for Americans’ welfare will tend to be those made to organizations focused 
on combating cross-border negative externalities.  And indeed, the vast 
majority of Americans’ internationally-targeted contributions are allocated 
precisely to these two classes of recipients.254  To the critic who falls in 
between the isolationist and universalist poles, and hence to most 
Americans, foreign giving ought to appear richly deserving of 
deductibility.  The empirical inquiries underlying the domestic-versus-
                                                                                                                          
governmental monitoring; it would go a long way toward eroding the autonomy of the global 
philanthropic sector.  Moreover, the benefits to the public fisc (and to instrumental rationality more 
generally) may be small, for the great bulk of Americans’ internationally-targeted contributions already 
flow to organizations that operate in developing countries and/or focus on combating negative 
interspatial externalities.  See AARFC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, supra note 173, at 44; see also 
supra notes 180–81, 188 and accompanying text.  And even if it were to receive substantial U.S. donor 
support, would the Vienna Opera be such an inadvisable target of subsidy?  Apart from a basic set of 
public charity and private foundation qualifications, the charitable deduction has been constructed so 
that the government is scrupulously neutral among donors’ choices: the tax expenditure is purely a 
function of donativeness.  To reject certain types of foreign gifts as undesirable would undermine this 
commitment to neutrality and the decentralization it allows.  There would be something a little 
inconsistent, a little coercive, and, to my mind, a little ugly about a system that allowed deductions for 
gifts to the Metropolitan Opera but not to the Vienna Opera. 
254 See supra note 253. 
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international comparisons may be too speculative to yield precise answers, 
but this basic outcome emerges clear enough. 
Under almost any hierarchy of policy goals or specification of 
community, then, the integrated theory affirms the claim that foreign gifts 
have to the deduction.  As a matter of tax theory, broadly construed, it is 
hard to identify a principled basis on which to restrict deductions 
geographically.255  The integrated theory points instead to an equivalency 
ideal, whereby internationally-targeted contributions are granted the same 
tax treatment as domestically-targeted contributions, except to the extent 
justified by reasonable extrinsic considerations.  
B. Complications 
The most meaningful way in which the United States violates the 
equivalency ideal is through the water’s edge policy, which raises the 
relative cost and complexity of foreign giving.256  The violation is not so 
dramatic, however: although it denies deductions for gifts made directly to 
foreign charities, the water’s edge policy allows full deductions for gifts 
made to U.S.-based intermediaries that send or use the funds abroad.  
Other countries deviate much more seriously from the equivalency ideal.  
Brazil, Russia, and Thailand, for example, allow no deductions unless all 
donated funds are used by the donee within the home country.257  Countries 
like Italy, Poland, and South Africa, on the other hand, place no geographic 
restrictions on the deduction.258  One reason for these disparities must lie in 
the fact that international giving raises two complications outside the 
purview of traditional tax theory.  The most obvious complication concerns 
cross-border oversight.  The subtler, yet perhaps more interesting 
complication concerns foreign policy.  Both make it more difficult to say 
whether the water’s edge policy is responsive to the equivalency ideal, and 
whether it adds or subtracts value. 
Oversight considerations have long been the central defense for the 
water’s edge policy.259  The basic concern is that with foreign gifts the IRS 
will have a harder time ensuring that the donor and donee have met the 
terms of § 170—ensuring that the donee is organized and operated 
                                                                                                                          
255 Jane Peebles suggests an unprincipled basis for the water’s edge policy and the “arcane” rules 
that attend it: they create a lot of work for lawyers and accountants.  E-mail from Jane Peebles, Partner, 
Bingham McCutchen LLP, to David Pozen (May 16, 2006, 4:45 PM) (on file with Connecticut Law 
Review).  This reality may help explain why, despite widespread disapproval in the nonprofit tax law 
community, the water’s edge policy has not been the subject of any substantial reformist efforts. 
256 See supra Part II.B (explaining the water’s edge policy).  Apart from the water’s edge policy, 
the equivalency ideal also supports the minimization of charitable-giving tax differentials along the 
other, less dramatic dimensions adumbrated in Part II.  Harvey Dale provides a sensible list of reforms 
to this end in Dale, supra note 39, at 696. 
257 See supra note 67. 
258 See supra note 67.   
259 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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exclusively for charitable purposes, that no part of its net earnings inure to 
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and so forth—because 
of resource and informational constraints as well as possible jurisdictional 
obstacles.  These regulatory difficulties lead Professor Peter Wiedenbeck 
to ask rhetorically: “How will the IRS assure that [§ 170’s] conditions are 
satisfied in the case of a contribution to an organization located outside the 
United States?”260  For Wiedenbeck and others, the only answer is to 
require these contributions to flow through a U.S.-based intermediary, 
creating both an administrative and jurisdictional hook. 
This is a reasonable solution, but it is not the only solution, and it is 
certainly not the most narrowly tailored solution.  Although in theory the 
intermediary system facilitates accountability, in practice both state and 
federal oversight is minimal.261  More important, as critics of the water’s 
edge policy have argued, there are ways the IRS could retain oversight 
capacity without denying deductions for gifts made directly to foreign 
charities (or to some subset thereof).  The most straightforward alternative 
would be to require foreign organizations seeking tax-deductible U.S. gifts 
to register with the IRS and submit to its jurisdiction, just as we do 
currently for organizations seeking recognition of their exempt status under 
§ 501(c)(3).262  Many organizations would never register because of the 
filing fees, ignorance, or a desire to avoid IRS scrutiny; for those 
unregistered donees, the water’s edge regime could remain in place.   
Other schemes would allow for greater flexibility.  The United States 
could most fully realize the equivalency ideal by rescinding all geographic 
restrictions on deductibility—if this sounds radical, recall that unlike the 
income tax, the gift and estate taxes have never been subject to such 
restrictions263—and then devoting additional resources to monitoring.  It 
could expand on its bilateral treaties with Canada, Israel, and Mexico by 
dropping the local-source-income limitation (or failing that, dropping the 
percentage limits) and granting waivers to donees located in all countries 
whose regulators it trusts.264  It could lead efforts to harmonize nations’ 
nonprofit laws and create an international body to enforce them.265  It could 
                                                                                                                          
260 Wiedenbeck, supra note 43, at 103. 
261 See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND 
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 1–2 (2004); Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector?: 
Reforming Law and Public Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731, 760 (1994) 
(book review). 
262 See supra notes 56, 62 and accompanying text (describing Harvey Dale’s and Kimberly 
Blanchard’s proposals to this effect).  Dale also recommends relaxing the filing requirements for 
foreign charities.  Dale, supra note 39, at 690, 696. 
263 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
264 See sources cited supra note 40 (explaining these treaties). 
265 Darryll Jones and Penina Kessler Lieber advocate for such efforts.  Jones, supra note 48, at 
140; Lieber, supra note 63, at 740–42. 
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rely on independent watchdog groups to identify problem donees.  It could 
allow donors to unregistered foreign charities to make an affirmative case 
for deductibility.  Or it could employ any combination of the above.  These 
schemes all have distinct costs and benefits and countless permutations, 
and this is not the place to explore their practicalities.  The point here is 
that oversight concerns could be allayed through any number of 
mechanisms, in place of or alongside the water’s edge policy, that would 
lower the cost of foreign giving, erode the often unnecessary layer of U.S. 
middlemen, and better preserve an ethic of equivalency.  
Beyond basic oversight to ensure that charitable contributions meet the 
terms of § 170 and do not, for example, constitute an impermissible quid 
pro quo, a more crucial area of oversight concerns gifts to terrorist 
organizations pretending to be charitable entities.  This has been a topic of 
intense interest since September 11, 2001, and the subsequent revelation 
that terrorist organizations, at home and abroad, had been using charitable 
fronts for their operations, providing not only legal cover but also, 
perversely, state subsidy for their operations.266  The threat posed by these 
organizations is so great and so salient that even the best-known opponent 
of the water’s edge policy, Harvey Dale, recently conceded that it makes 
reform unlikely.267  Yet here too, the water’s edge policy is an awkward fit 
for the policy goal.  While it is vital that we root out donations that abet 
terrorism, requiring foreign charities seeking deductible status to register 
with the IRS or an international agency could generate more information 
on global flows of terrorist financing, at the same time that it reduces the 
impediments to legitimate flows of charity.  Requiring a U.S.-based 
intermediary, by contrast, does little to separate out legitimate from 
illegitimate giving and may better enable U.S. individuals to coordinate 
support for terrorists abroad.268  
Everyone can agree that the charitable deduction should never be 
allowed to support terrorist entities, that the rules of § 170 should apply to 
                                                                                                                          
266 For a summary of these revelations and the attendant legal developments, see Andrew J. 
Brauer, Terrorist Financing Through the U.S. Nonprofit Sector: Towards a More Effective Balancing 
of Crucial Global Priorities (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Connecticut Law 
Review). 
267 Dale, supra note 66, at 5. 
268 Separate from the role of U.S.-based intermediary organizations as tools of IRS oversight, 
preserving a legal mandate for these organizations could perhaps be argued on other grounds.  For 
instance, a utilitarian theorist of the deduction could argue that the intermediaries improve the quality 
of foreign recipients by exporting institutional know-how as well as donor funds.  A communitarian 
might argue that they preserve a local element to foreign giving, enrich discourse surrounding 
international causes, and augment the value-inculcating potential of transnational charity.  These 
arguments have some theoretical appeal, but here again, the water’s edge policy is awkwardly crafted 
to serve the goals.  The reality of “friends of” organizations, which exist only to pass through 
Americans’ contributions to foreign donees, see supra note 46 and accompanying text, belies both the 
utilitarian and communitarian vision.  A policy that encouraged, rather than mandated, more substantial 
forms of intermediaries would serve utilitarian and communitarian goals more directly and less 
expensively than the current policy. 
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foreign gifts as well as domestic gifts, and that foreign deductibility can be 
reasonably circumscribed by these needs; the oversight difficulties lie in 
the balancing of the equivalency ideal with regulatory exigency.  
Substantively, however, the more difficult issues arise when Americans’ 
foreign charity decisions conflict with the government’s foreign policy 
goals without violating any laws.  A good example of this involves 
contributions to foreign NGOs that perform, provide counseling on, or 
lobby for abortion.  Under the Bush Administration’s highly controversial 
“global gag rule,” official U.S. policy is to deny government aid to any 
such organization.269  Representative losers from this rule include the 
International Planned Parenthood Federation affiliates, mostly in Africa, 
which had to forfeit all government funding on account of their abortion-
related activities.270  
Except not quite: American donors can still receive deductions for gifts 
made to the Planned Parenthood Federation of America—and thereby 
enlist all other U.S. taxpayers in their subsidy—which can then transmit 
those funds to Planned Parenthood Associations overseas.  Allowing these 
deductions collides with the government’s stated goal by making it an 
indirect sponsor.  Other conflicts with policy goals will be less direct, but 
just as real.  For example, some INGOs may operate programs inimical to 
government objectives in unfriendly states like Burma and Cuba, and many 
environmental INGOs oppose the Administration’s refusal to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol on climate change.271  The charitable deduction might be 
seen in these instances as a subversive agent of foreign policy—covertly 
thwarting the will of the electorate, undemocratically transforming 
individual donors into foreign policymakers, undermining national 
interests.  These accusations would be available with or without the 
requirement of U.S.-based intermediaries.  To enable the government to 
exercise greater control over internationally-targeted contributions, an 
exclusive program of matching grants such as Ireland’s272 might seem 
more attractive.  
                                                                                                                          
269 For explanations and criticisms of this rule (sometimes referred to as the Mexico City Policy), 
see Editorial, Lift the Global Gag Rule, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, at A12, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, NYT File; Center for Reproductive Rights, The Bush Global Gag Rule: Endangering 
Women’s Health, Free Speech and Democracy (July 2003), http://www.reproductiverights.org/ 
pub_fac_ggrbush.html; Global Gag Rule Impact Project, Access Denied: U.S. Restrictions on 
International Family Planning, http://www.globalgagrule.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2006). 
270 See PLANNED PARENTHOOD, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, THE GLOBAL GAG RULE, AND 
HIV/AIDS FUNDING 5–7 (2003), available at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/PPFA/news-
030702AIDS_report.pdf.  
271 See Sverker C. Jagers & Johannes Stripple, Climate Governance Beyond the State, 9 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 385 (2003). 
272 See supra note 67. 
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This idea of the charitable deduction as the privatization of foreign 
policy is provocative and potentially generative,273 but it by no means 
follows that the proper response is to exercise tighter gatekeeping over 
eligible foreign donees.  Although domestic charities may be prohibited 
from engaging in substantial lobbying or other political activities,274 many 
of them routinely advocate positions at odds with those of the current 
regime (including the global gag rule and the failure to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol), and we think this a good thing: “Active engagement in public 
affairs has long been touted as a vital and noble function of the third 
sector.”275  Creating a government-supported space for dissent in foreign 
policy, an Executive-dominated area not generally amenable to minority 
views, can be seen as democratic in the participatory sense, if not in the 
republican sense.  It is a mechanism for what Professor Heather Gerken 
has termed “dissenting by deciding,” whereby decentralized 
decisionmaking processes allow minority groups to set policies that bind 
the majority.276  There are concerns of countermajoritarianism and 
inefficiency with dissenting by deciding, but there may be offsetting 
benefits, including an expanded marketplace of ideas, deeper potential for 
transformative reform, and Professor Steven Shiffrin’s idea that the 
“institutional promotion of dissent is necessary to combat injustice.”277 
Disallowing the charitable deduction for donations used to support 
Planned Parenthood Associations abroad would, furthermore, create severe 
investigative and civil liberties problems.  Individual donations to the 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America would need to be tracked and 
sorted, and the programming of all recipient charities, foreign and 
domestic, would need to be mined for potential conflict with government 
policies that may shift over time.  Any such scheme would unravel the 
deduction’s opacity and, potentially, the delicate social compromises it has 
facilitated.278  The NGO community would be in an uproar; charitable 
                                                                                                                          
273 In a short companion piece to this Article, I suggest how it might be fruitful to explore the 
foreign policy role of the charitable deduction and other nonprofit tax privileges through the lens of tax 
expenditure analysis.  Pozen, supra note 242. 
274 See Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3, at 53–66 (reviewing the major regulations affecting 
§ 501(c)(3) status). 
275 Id. at 53. 
276 Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005). 
277 Id. at 1805 (quoting STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF 
AMERICA 91 (1999)).  One feature that differentiates the charitable deduction from typical modes of 
dissenting by deciding is that those individuals best able to avail themselves of this route, namely 
wealthy itemizing taxpayers, will tend to be empowered political and economic actors, not traditional 
minorities.  Even wealthy taxpayers, however, are typically disempowered actors in matters of foreign 
policy, and almost 30% of taxpayers now claim the charitable deduction.  See supra note 109. 
278 See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the benefits of having the deduction’s subsidy be “hidden”). 
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giving would likely decline.  Politicizing international deductions would be 
a very costly means to promote foreign policy consistency.  
While I have seen no other commentators identify the charitable 
deduction as an instrument for state-sponsored foreign policy dissent, 
many commentators since 9/11 have voiced the complaint that the United 
States receives insufficient credit for its foreign aid spending.  For 
example, in a report widely cited by Administration officials, Carol 
Adelman and colleagues argue that official statistics understate Americans’ 
generosity to the developing world because the statistics exclude private 
transfers.279  Adelman and colleagues do not take up the charitable 
deduction, but they might have: although the deduction’s opacity hides its 
less attractive elements from the American public, it also hides its 
generosity from the global community.280  As a result, there may be a 
tradeoff between the deduction’s ability to broker domestic compromise 
and its ability to generate international goodwill toward the United States 
or, at least, toward the U.S. government.  Official foreign aid is more 
visible, better able to exploit economies of scale, and may carry greater 
expressive force.  Replacing the implicit subsidy of foreign giving—now 
worth perhaps one to two billion dollars per year281—with explicit 
government aid might therefore stimulate an increase in goodwill, in 
addition to mitigating oversight burdens and other foreign policy concerns. 
On the other hand, increasing government aid at the expense of the 
charitable deduction may dampen goodwill on a number of fronts.  
                                                                                                                          
279 ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 180; see also Carol C. Adelman, The Privatization of Foreign 
Aid: Reassessing National Largesse, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 9; Charlotte Beers, Under 
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Remarks to the Advisory Committee for Voluntary 
Foreign Aid (Feb. 11, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/r/us/18260.htm (“The good work we 
do, government or private . . . [is] simply not known, and I think that’s unacceptable.”).  David 
Roodman and Scott Standley describe the influence of Adelman’s work in Roodman & Standley, supra 
note 3, at 9–10. 
280 Professor Evelyn Brody has made a similar point in the domestic context.  Brody, supra note 
105, at 753 (“The public fails to equate the tax expenditure to revenue that flows into the federal fisc 
and is then reallocated [via the deduction] to the charities of the taxpayers’ choice.  In short, the 
government does not get credit for this financial support, and charities often assert that they receive no 
public funds.”).  Matching grants and tax credits, two oft-proposed alternatives to the deduction, would 
be more easily recognizable as subsidies, though still more opaque than direct government spending. 
281 I have seen no attempts to calculate the size of this subsidy, but if we take Fishman and 
Schwarz’s estimate that the charitable deduction saved U.S. federal income taxpayers $40.6 billion in 
2003, FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 23, at 689, along with the fact that approximately 2% to 4% of 
Americans’ giving now goes to foreign causes, see supra note 181 and accompanying text, simple 
multiplication suggests that deductions for these gifts generated between $812 million and $1.62 billion 
in savings.  The real figure should be at the upper end of this range, and very possibly higher, given that 
4% is a more realistic figure than 2%, aggregate giving levels have been rising, the estate and gift taxes 
and state income taxes also subsidize foreign contributions, and higher-bracket taxpayers seem more 
likely to support international causes. 
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Individual and corporate giving are likely to fall substantially;282 displeased 
American donors may convey their anger to groups abroad; foreign 
recipients may be more skeptical of government aid than private aid; and a 
more centralized process for distributing charity will tend to reduce the 
diversity of recipients and exacerbate the democratic-process pathology of 
systematically underweighting long-term risks.283  More basically, 
however, the tension between the charitable deduction and direct aid may 
be artificial.  One to two billion dollars is not a vast amount in the scheme 
of the foreign affairs budget, which in recent years has included over $16 
billion annually for official development assistance.284  If the charitable 
deduction is failing to generate goodwill commensurate with its economic 
cost, the failure could be seen as one of marketing.  By clarifying to the 
international community that the charitable deduction not only subsidizes 
foreign charity, but also does so in a resolutely apolitical way, the U.S. 
government has a chance to bolster the deduction’s utility as an instrument 
of soft power and stimulate greater overall goodwill.  In the current 
political clime, opacity may not be worth it. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For better and worse, tax deductions for internationally-targeted 
donations are already raising oversight concerns, already delegating 
foreign policy to individual donors, already transforming civil society 
across the world.  A notoriously problematic policy, the charitable 
deduction only becomes more problematic in the international context.  
Yet it also becomes a more powerful vehicle for generating collective 
benefits—for enhancing social welfare, distributive justice, and 
communitarian values not just globally, but also domestically.  
This Article has tried to situate the charitable deduction in a broader 
critical and spatial context, and to show how it has provided a vital, 
underexplored link between U.S. tax policy and the “global associational 
revolution.”285  The analysis suggests that any deduction policy should aim 
to effectuate an ideal of geographic neutrality.  Replacing or 
supplementing the water’s edge policy with a less restrictive alternative 
would better comport with tax theory, across a wide range of normative 
                                                                                                                          
282 See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (noting the Center for Global Development’s 
estimate that over half of Americans’ internationally-targeted giving is attributable to the charitable 
deduction). 
283 See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the utilitarian benefits of international deductions). 
284 See supra note 179 (reporting 2003 OECD statistics).  This $16.3 billion figure is up from 
approximately $10 billion in 2000.  U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., FOREIGN AID IN THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST: PROMOTING FREEDOM, SECURITY, AND OPPORTUNITY 146 tbl.6.4 (2002), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/fani/Full_Report--Foreign_Aid_in_the_National_Interest.pdf. 
285 See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
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commitments, and better capitalize on the deduction’s virtues.  It would 
also be an act of political symbolism.  Against the widespread belief that 
the U.S. government is stingy with international aid, dismantling the 
water’s edge policy would demonstrate our commitment to foreign charity.  
It would send the message that—conditionally, consistent with our national 
security and national interest, yet wholeheartedly—America supports the 
revolution. 
